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Abstract
Essays in Applied Microeconomics

by
Eric Jonathon Osborne-Christenson

Adviser: Professor David Jaeger
This dissertation consists of three chapters and covers topics in applied microeconomics
broadly dened as health and labor. The precise topics are varied, with their unifying
thread being that they are all related to marginalized or at-risk communities. The rst
chapter estimates the impact of Daylight Saving Time (DST) on deaths of despair (DoD) in
the United States. Using Multiple Cause-of-Death Mortality Data from the National Vital
Statistics System of the National Center for Health Statistics from 1979-1988, the eect is
identied in two ways: a regression discontinuity design (RDD) that exploits discrete time
changes in the Spring and Fall; and a xed eects model (FE) that is identied with a policy
change and a switching mechanism that introduces random variation to DST's start and end
dates. This is one of the rst attempts to estimate the impact of DST on DoD and the rst
to use either identication strategy. The results from both methods suggest that the sleep
disruptions during the Spring transition cause suicide rates to rise by 6.25 percent and all
DoD to increase by 6.59 percent. There is no evidence for any change in suicide or all DoD
during the Fall transition. The contrasting results from Spring to Fall suggest that the entire
eect can be attributed to disruptions in sleep patterns rather than changes in ambient light
exposure.
The second chapter estimates the magnitude of own race preference among referees in
professional basketball. Previous research in this vein has depended on foul frequency and

v
the overall racial composition of referee crews for its estimates. This research adds to the literature by exploiting two unique data sets from the National Basketball Association (NBA).
The rst of these identies the specic referee that makes each foul call. The second reports
whether each call and material non-call is correct during the last two minutes of close games.
The results suggest referees call an additional 2-3 percent more calls against players of the
opposite race, holding the number of opposite race referees constant. This own-race preference is consistent for both black and white referees. There is also evidence that monitoring
can reduce or even eliminate this bias, a nding consistent with previous literature.
The nal chapter estimates the impact of minimum wages on school enrollment, labor
force participation, and idleness for people aged 16-19. Using the monthly release of the
Current Population Survey for the years 1995 to 2016, the eect is identied by comparing
outcomes in state-border-straddling county-pairs. This strategy represents an improvement
over canonical two-way xed eects model because it accounts for heterogeneous local labor
market trends. The focus on this paper also represents a departure from the bulk of minimum
wage literature, where the emphasis is on labor market outcomes. Here, the focus is on how
minimum wages inuence individual decision making. The results suggest minimum wages
increase school enrollment, while the evidence for labor force participation and idleness is
mixed and inconclusive.
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Chapter 1
Saving Light, Losing Lives: How
Daylight Saving Time Impacts Deaths of
Despair
1.1

Introduction

For the rst time since 1915-1917, life expectancy in the United States fell for three consecutive years between 2015 and 2017. This was largely due to a dramatic rise in suicides and
deaths from drug or alcohol overdose and abuse. In 2017 alone, more than 150,000 American died from one of these so-called deaths of despair (DoD), representing a six percent
increase from 2016 and a more than 100 percent increase since 1999 (see

Figure 1.1 ). All

told, accidental deaths including those related to drug and alcohol overdose is now the 3rd
leading cause of death in the United States while suicide is ranked 10th.1

1 All numbers here are from the Trust for America's Health (TFAH) and Well Being Trust (WBT) with
mortality data from the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Data obtained from the
WONDER database in December 2018.
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Figure 1.1: Aggregate Deaths Of Despair Over Time

Notes: Data from CDC WONDER Online Database, Compressed Mortality Files.

The underlying mechanisms driving DoD are no doubt numerous. Understanding even
one of them could help motivate policy that save lives. The goal of this paper is to investigate
two such potential causes: changes in ambient light exposure and disruptions to the circadian
rhythm that arise from the use of Daylight Saving Time (DST).
DST is the practice of advancing clocks forward by an hour during late Spring, Summer,
and early Fall months before reverting to Standard Time (ST) the rest of the year. It has
been used through most of the United States since Lyndon Johnson signed The Uniform
Time Act of 1966. Currently, over 300,000 million Americans are impacted by it, as well as
over 1.5 billion people worldwide.
DST was rst proposed by George Hudson in 1895. He argued that it would encourage
people to be awake during daylight hours, and over the next two decades it was proposed
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multiple times as a way of saving energy by reducing coal consumption. The German Empire
and Austria-Hungary were the rst to implement the policy nationwide on April 30, 1916 as
resources became scarce during World War I. Other countries, including the United States,
followed suit before largely abandoning it after the war. It again became a xture during
World War II and during the 1970's energy crisis, at which point it became a standard
peacetime practice for the rst time across large swaths of the world.
Despite its long history and widespread use, there is little evidence that DST actually
accomplishes its goal (Kellogg and Wol, 2008). In fact, some research suggests it may cause
energy consumption to raise, mostly because any reduction in light use is oset by increases
in heating and air conditioning (Momani and Ali, 2009; Krarti and Hajiah, 2011; Kotchen
and Grant, 2011; Sexton and Beatty, 2014).
The existing literature also suggests DST has a negative impact on society outside of
energy consumption. Doleac and Sanders (2015) estimate a 7 percent increase in robberies
following the shift to DST, amounting to a social cost of $59 million annually. Smith (2016)
estimates a 5.6 percent increase in fatal automobile accidents during the spring transition
at a social cost of $275 million yearly. Janszky et al. (2012) nd a 3.9 percent increase in
acute myocardial infarction for the rst week after Spring clocks shift forward.
The evidence for the impact of DST on mental health, including incidents of drug/alcohol
dependence, suicide, or suicidal behavior, is more mixed. Shapiro et al. (1990) nd no
evidence for an increase in the incidence of a host of mental health symptoms. Similarly,
Lahti et al. (2008) nd no eect of DST transitions on hospital treatments due to manic
episodes in Finland for the years 19872003. That said, van Cauter and Turek (1986) nd a
strong relationship between disruptions in circadian rhythm and depression; and Quercioli
(2010), which uses time discontinuities along time zone boundaries, nds that being on the
west side of the threshold causes a 10 percent increase in the suicide rate.
The literature on DST as it relates to DoD specically is limited. The rst to address the
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subject is Berk et al. (2008), which uses data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics on
deaths potentially due to suicide between 1971 and 2001. After accounting for season and
year trends, they nd weak eects of DST transitions on the number of suicides for men, but
no eect for women. These ndings represent an important rst step in understanding the
relationship between DST and suicide, but the authors were also constrained by signicant
data limitations. First, due to Australia's relatively small population, there was a total of
only 61,598 deaths over the 31 year period, or an average of only 5.4 deaths per day. In
comparison, there have been more deaths by suicide in the United States over the last year
and a half alone. Furthermore, their mortality data was aggregated at the national level,
but each state has its own DST transition date, so the authors could not be precisely sure of
the number of deaths on each side of the threshold. These factors combined raise questions
about the precision of the estimates.
Jin and Ziebarth (2019) looks at human capital more broadly using 160 million hospital
admissions from Germany and 3.4 million survey responses from the Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance System in the United States from 2000 to 2008. They use this to estimate the
impact of DST on a large set of health outcomes, including hospitalizations for attempted
suicide and drug overdose. Their primary specication uses daily dummy variables around
the DST transition and a set of seasonal controls. Exclusively considering the Fall transition,
they nd evidence that DST decreases the rate of suicide attempts, nd no evidence for a
change drug overdoses, and does not measure alcohol overdoses. Given the broad scope
of their research, a more robust treatment of these particular outcomes was left for future
research.
Most recently, Lindinberger, Ackermann, and Parzeller (2019) estimate the impact of
DST on suicide using data from forensic autopsies performed at the Institute of Legal
Medicine, University Clinic of the Goethe University of Frankfurt/Main, Germany from
2005 to 2015. To do this, they perform a dierence in means test for deaths occurring two
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weeks before and two weeks after the transition. They nd a statistically signicant increase
in suicides following the Spring transition and no eect during the Fall shift. This was primarily a descriptive paper, however, and no further analysis was done. There were also only
65 total suicides over this 10 year period, which suggests a need for further investigation.
Building on this research, this paper advances the literature in a number of ways. First,
following methodology in Smith (2016), it is the rst attempt to estimate the impact of
DST on DoD using a regression discontinuity design (RDD). Given the discrete nature
of the discontinuity, DST transitions are particularly well suited for this sort of analysis.
Furthermore, it addresses Sood and Ghosh (2007)'s concern that seasonal variation could
drive RDD results by verifying them with a xed eects (FE) approach that exploits a policy
change in the timing of DST and an assignment mechanism that exogenously introduces
variation in the DST start and end date. This is also the rst paper that attempts to
disentangle the impact of sleep disruptions and light exposure on DoD brought about by
DST. It does this by comparing estimates in the Spring, where Americans lose between 3240 minutes of sleep (Barnes and Wagner, 2009; Harrison, 2013; Medina et al., 2015), with the
Fall, where there is no evidence of any change to sleep patterns (Barnes and Wagner, 2009;
Harrison, 2013). Lastly, this paper uses aggregate, day-level mortality data from the United
States between 1979 and 1988, so it benets from having a large data set and knowledge of
precise DST transition dates.
The results from both identication strategies are strongly suggestive of Spring DST
transitions having a large and meaningful impact on DoD. Using multiple bandwidth selectors
and kernels, all RDD estimates suggest the transition increases suicide and all DoD by
between 5 and 8 percent around the threshold, while the FE specication estimates a 3 to 5
percent jump. The results for the Fall DST transitions suggest no impact on DoD, regardless
of identication strategy. Since there is no evidence for any change in sleep patterns during
the Fall, this last conclusion suggests the jump in DoD during the spring can be attributed
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to the loss of sleep exclusively.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: (2)

Daylight Saving Time gives a brief

overview of DST in the United States and describes the mechanisms through which it impacts
DoD; (3)

Data describes the data, its restrictions, and the features that make it suited for

this analysis; (4)

Empirical Strategy outlines the RDD and FE identication strategies and

the assumptions required for them to give unbiased estimates; (5)
and robustness checks; (6)

Results presents results

Conclusion summarizes the salient outcomes and discusses their

implications.

1.2

Daylight Saving Time

During his time as an American envoy to France, Benjamin Franklin published a satirical
letter in the Journal de Paris suggesting that Parisians economize on candles by waking up
with the sun, and proposed they enforce the behavior by taxing window shutters, rationing
candles, and waking the masses with church bells and cannons. Despite his urging, DST
didn't come to France or the United States until WWI, and didn't become a permanent
xture in the US until almost 200 years later when Lyndon Johnson signed the Uniform
Time Act of 1966. The bill set universal start and stop dates for DST, but gave states the
autonomy to opt in or out. With the exception of Hawaii, Indiana, and Arizona, all states
joined.
The guidelines outlined in 1966 have remained largely unchanged since, and were only
altered once for the years under consideration in this paper. This happened when the
Uniform Time Act was amended in 1986, moving the date forward by three weeks in the
Spring. In 1986 and before, clocks changed on the third Sunday in April. Afterward, they
moved forward on the rst Sunday in April. Guidelines for the Fall remained the same.
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There are two possible channels through which these laws could impact DoD. First, there
are discrete changes in light exposure. In the Spring, there is less light in the morning and
more light in the evening. However, as many as 65 percent of Americans wake up after
sunrise around the transition, meaning the net eect in the Spring is an increase in exposure
to sunlight.2 In the Fall, there is more light in the morning and less light in the evening. As
in the Spring, many Americans are still asleep when the sun rises, so the net eect in the
Fall is a decrease in light exposure. This eect is illustrated in

Figure 1.2, which shows the

cumulative distribution of wake-up times for Americans overlaid with the average sunrise
times during the rst week after the Spring and Fall transitions, and the last week before
the Spring and Fall transitions. Following Smith (2016),

Figure 1.2 uses sunrise times for

St. Louis, MO, which is the closest city to the population weighted center of the continental
United States.
It is also possible for DST transitions to disrupt sleep patterns. In the Spring, clocks
move forward an hour at 2:00am, which reduces to total number of hours in the day to 23.
Evidence suggests the bulk of this loss falls on sleep hours. Using the American Time Use
Survey data from 2003-2006, Barnes and Wagner (2009) nd that this lost hour causes people
to sleep 40 minutes less on average. Using electronic monitors to precisely measure hours of
sleep for 40 high school students, Medina et al. (2015) nd that teens lose approximately 32
minutes of sleep a night. The eect of this loss can be felt between two and 14 days (Barnes
and Wagner, 2009; Harrison, 2013; Medina et al., 2015). Therefore, the Spring transition
causes observers to enjoy more exposure to sun but discretely lose between 32-40 minutes of
sleep and cumulatively lose up to two hours and 42 minutes of sleep in the weeks following
the transition.

2 Estimates using data from a survey conducted by Edison Research that included 1,550 respondents ages
18-54. It was conducted in January 2015. Data was obtained August 2019.
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Figure 1.2: Sunrise And Wake-Up Times Around DST Transitions

Notes: Following Smith (2016) this demonstration uses St. Louis, MO for its sunrise times, since it is the closest city to the

population weighted center of the continental US. This gure shows the cumulative wake-up times for Americans overlaid with
the average sunrise times for the rst week after the Spring and Fall transitions and the last week before the Fall and Spring
transitions.

In the Fall, clocks move backward an hour at 2:00am, which increases the total number of
hours in the day to 25. While it's possible the extra hour would cause people to sleep more,
there is little evidence that they do (Barnes and Wagner, 2009; Harrison, 2013). Therefore,
the cumulative impact of the Fall transition is solely a loss in sun exposure. This aspect
of DST makes it possible to tease out how its dierent features impact suicide individually.
Estimates for the impact of DST in the Fall can be interpreted as the impact of losing light
exposure alone, while the impact of sleep disruptions can be estimated by subtracting the
impact of the Fall transition from the impact of the Spring transition.
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Data

For mortality data, this paper uses Multiple Cause-of-Death Mortality Data from the National Vital Statistics System of the National Center for Health Statistics from 1979-1988.
These exact years were chosen for three reasons. First, while records exist as far back as
1959, Daylight Savings wasn't implemented until 1967. Furthermore, death totals by day of
year are not available between 1967-1971 and from 1989-present. Since this is crucial for the
RDD design, these years have to be excluded, as well. Lastly, many specic causes of death
related to this topic were not reliably coded until 1979, so all previous years are removed.
For a death to be included in the sample, its primary cause has to be suicide, drug
overdose or dependence, or alcohol overdose or dependence.3 Any instance where cause of
death was in the least bit unclear is excluded. Deaths that occur in Arizona, Hawaii, or
Indiana are also excluded, as all or parts of these states did not observe DST during the
sample period. Following Smith (2016), death totals are adjusted for hours in the day, so
that deaths occurring at the Spring transition are increased by 4.3 percent, while deaths
during the Fall transition are decreased by 4 percent. All results in this paper are robust to
the exclusion of these adjustments.4
Because of these restrictions and the relative paucity of DoD at the daily level, the dependent variable (the natural log of deaths on a given day) is aggregated to the national level.
Over the study period, there are approximately 87 suicides or deaths related to drug/alcohol
overdose/dependence across the country per day. This means daily, state-level totals would
often be zero, and variation from day to day would be likely be large. Aggregating smooths
out these totals and minimizes the possibility of external factors like weather inuencing
local results. Furthermore, DoD death totals are dominated by suicide, so the proceeding
3 Technically, the denition of DoD includes drug and alcohol related disease, but these conditions result
from long standing behavior and cannot reasonably be attributed to any one discrete event. As such, they
are not included in the sample.

4 The replicated primary results can be found in the appendix in

Table A1.2.
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analysis is performed using a suicide only sample and an all DoD sample. Unfortunately,
the small number of non-suicide related DoD deaths preclude any analysis of those deaths
in isolation.
One concern with the use of data from this time period is that it pre-dates the sharp
upswing in DoD that began in the early part of the 21st century. It is important to note
that the objective of this paper is not to answer why DoD has increased so dramatically in
recent years. Rather, its goal is to explain one contributing factor to the overall number
of deaths. Furthermore, while the direct relationship between DST and DoD has not been
tested exhaustively in the past, the broader literature on sleep deprivation and DoD has
remained largely consistent over time (Yücel A
gargün and Kara, 1998; Goldstein, Bridge,
and Brent, 2008; Kohyama, 2011, McCall et al., 2013).5 So, even if other factors exist that
are driving the rise in DoD today, there is evidence that the eect of this particular input on
its prevalence has remained consistent. Lastly, during the time under consideration, results
are largely driven by suicide, whose rate has not hanged markedly since the sample period
(see

Figure 1.3 ).

5 As will be shown shortly, changes in sleep patterns are the the primary driver for a change in DoD
around the DST threshold.
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Figure 1.3: DoD Rate From 1979-1988 Overlaid With DoD Rate From 2008-2017

1.4

Empirical Strategy

1.4.1 Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD)
The primary identication strategy uses an RDD. Every year there are two discrete changes
to the observed time of day: once when clocks are set forward an hour in the Spring and
once when clocks are set back one hour in the Fall. These are sharp transitions are for
all states under consideration, making this strategy particularly well suited for addressing

CHAPTER 1.

HOW DAYLIGHT SAVING TIME IMPACTS DEATHS OF DESPAIR

12

the impact of DST on DoD. Following Smith (2016), the primary specication uses a local
linear regression, since there is no practical benet to using higher order polynomials of the
running variable (Gelman and Imbens, 2018). DoD varies by day-of-week, month, and by
year (Maldonado and Kraus, 1991), so all death totals are demeaned by day-of-week, month,
and year. Outside of these alterations, the estimating equation mirrors Imbens and Lemieux
(2008) and is as follows:

lnDoDdy = β0 + β1 DSTdy + f (T ran) + f (DSTdy · T randy ) + udy

(1.1)

lnDoDdy is dened as the natural log of aggregate DoD for day d in year y.6 In some
specications this is replaced with lnSuicidesdy , the natural log of aggregate suicides for day

d in year y. DSTdy is a dummy variable equaling 1 if day d in year y occurs during DST.
T randt is centered at the transition date for each year. The primary specication uses a
uniform kernel and Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014)'s optimal bandwidth selector.
For robustness, specications using alternative bandwidth selectors and Epanechnikov and
triangular kernels are also estimated. The parameter of interest is β1 , which can be interpreted as the local average treatment eect on DoD caused by the DST transition. Note
that regressions for the Spring and Fall transitions are performed independently. In both
cases the variables are dened the same, with the exception being the transition date under
consideration.
There are three assumptions that must be met for a sharp RDD design to give unbiased
results. First, assignment to treatment must occur through a known, measurable, and deterministic decision rule. Second, the probability of assignment must jump from 0 to 1 at
6 The rst Sunday under DST is only 23 hours long, which means the total number of fatalities appear
articially low.

Following Smith (2016), the death total on these days are adjusted upward 4.3 percent.

Likewise, since the rst Sunday under ST is 25 hours long, death totals are adjusted downward by 4 percent.
All estimates are robust to the exclusion of these adjustments. Replication of the primary specication can
be found in the appendix in Table A1.2.
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the cut-o. Third, factors that could inuence DoD must be locally continuous about the
threshold. The rst two assumptions are met by construction. The United States has known
DST transition dates, and all states that choose to be bound by them are, in fact, bound by
them absolutely. All situations where this is not necessarily true have been dropped from
the sample.
To test the third assumption, factors related to DoD where daily data is available are
inserted into the primary estimating equation as the dependent variable. The rst of these
variables is precipitation, since weather is related to suicide rates (especially among the
elderly) (Salib, 1997; Deisenhammer, Kemmler, and Parson, 2003)7 and drug overdose (Veysey, Kamanyire, and Volans, 1999). Data for this variable comes from daily totals for the
40 largest cities in the United States between 1979 and 1988. The second variable tested
is the NASDAQ Composite's closing price, since wealth, income, and uctuations in the
business cycle are also related to suicide (Saucer, 1993; Viren, 1996) and drug overdose. For
this variable, the transition date is centered at the Monday following the Sunday threshold
since there is no trading on weekends. In both cases, there is no evidence of any discontinuity across the DST threshold.8 This is not conclusive evidence that the third identifying
assumption is met, but it is highly suggestive.

1.4.2 Fixed Eects (FE) Model
One advantage of the RDD is that it looks at variation within year, which means it's able
to account for trends in DoD within each study year. This is important because of the
potential for suicide contagion - a phenomenon where instances of suicide can themselves
lead to more suicide - and epidemics like crack cocaine or fentanyl that can ood a market
7 There is research that contradict these ndings (Ajdacic-Gross et al. 2007)
8 Results of this test are in the appendix, Table A1.1.
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during particular years or periods in time. However, given the consistent nature of DST
transitions - eighth of 10 years under consideration use the same time in the Spring and
all ten years use the same time in the Fall - there is a risk that it's capturing season or
time-of-month eects rather than the DST transition in particular.
To ameliorate this concern, Sood and Ghosh (2007) and Smith (2016) suggest a FE model
to estimate the impact of DST. The estimating equation for this identication strategy is:

lnDoDdy = β0 + β1 spDSTdy + β2 f aDSTdy + DY eard + DW eekdy + Y eary + udy

(1.2)

lnDoDdy is dened as the natural log of aggregate DoD for day d in year y. In some
specications this is replaced with lnSuicidesdy , the natural log of aggregate suicides for day

d in year y. spDSTdy is a dummy variable equaling 1 if day d in year y occurs during DST
and before July 1st. f aDSTdy is a dummy variable equaling 1 if day d in year y occurs during
DST and after June 30th. DY eard , DW eekdy , and Y eary are day-of-year, day-of-week, and
year dummies, respectively. β1 and β2 are the parameters of interest. β1 can be interpreted
as the average eect of DST during the dates that change their DST status over the sample
period in the Spring. Similarly, β2 can be interpreted as the average eect of DST during
the dates that change their DST status over the sample period in the Fall.
For this strategy to be identied there must be random variation in the start and end
dates for DST. There are two sources of this variation. First, there was an amendment to
the Uniform Time Act in 1986 that changed the beginning of DST to the rst Sunday in
April. Before this change, the Spring transition had been the last Sunday of April. This
means that for 1987 and 1988, DST began three weeks earlier than it had before. Second,
the assignment mechanism (the rst Sunday in April or the last Sunday in April) means
there is variation in the precise day of year each transition occurs. The variation from both
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Figure 1.4. Panel A shows the variation in Spring while Panel B

shows the variation in Fall.
Figure 1.4: Variation In DST And ST Coverage

Note s: These graphs illustrate the variation in starting and stopping day for DST. Each bar shows the frequency particular

days of the year fall under ST and DST during the ten year sample period. Panel A represents the Spring transition while
Panel B represents the Fall transition. Variation in Panel A comes from the DST assignment mechanism and an Amendment

to the Uniform Time Act that changed the starting day for DST for the last two years of the sample. Variation in Panel B
comes just from the assignment mechanism alone.

1.5

Results

The primary results for the RDD for Spring are represented visually in
and

Panel A (suicide)

Panel B (all DoD) from Figure 1.5. Here, the average residuals from a regression of the

log of suicides and all DoD demeaned by day-of-week, month, and year are plotted against
the T randt variable. A break in the trend line at the transition date indicates the magnitude
of DST's impact on suicide and total DoD discreetly around the threshold, and can be interpreted as the estimate of β1 from equation (1).9 Visual inspection suggests a meaningful
jump in suicides and all DoD during the Spring transition. Consistent with previous literature, the trend line drops back to its baseline within two weeks. This suggests the mechanism
9 Results remain signicant and similar in magnitude when not demeaned by day-of-week, month, and
year. Results available upon request.
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through which DST impacts DoD is predominantly the disruption in sleep pattern, as the
change in ambient light exposure remains mostly unchanged after the transition date, while
sleep disruption is a discrete event whose eect would wane over time.
Figure 1.5: The Eect Of DST On Suicide And DoD, Spring

Notes: The residuals are from a regressions of log of suicide or all DoD (Panels A/C and B/D , respectively) on day-of-week,

month, and year dummy variables. Each point is the average of all residuals for that date relative to the Spring transition date
(Panels A and B ) or the placebo Spring transition date (Panels C and D ). Fitted lines are from locally weighted regressions.

The results for a placebo test can be found in

Figure 1.5, Panels C and D for suicide

and all DoD, respectively. This test addresses a concern by Smith (2016) that the transition
date itself might have something unique about it that drives the results. To do this, it
exploits the 1986 amendment to the Uniform Time Act that changed the transition into
DST in the Spring. For the years 1979-1986, the placebo transition date is assigned using
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the mechanism from 1987-1988; while the placebo transition date in 1987-1988 is assigned
using the mechanism from 1979-1986. For both suicide and DoD, there is no visual break
at the placebo DST threshold, suggesting it's DST itself that drives the results in
and

B.

The primary results for the RDD for Fall are represented visually in
and

Panels A

Panel A (suicide)

Panel B (all DoD) from Figure 1.6. As before, the average residuals from a regression

of the log of suicides and all DoD demeaned by day-of-week, month, and year are plotted
against the T randt variable. A break in the trend line at the transition date indicates the
magnitude of DST's impact on suicide and total DoD discreetly around the threshold, and
can be interpreted as the estimate of β1 from equation (1). Visual inspection suggests the
Fall DST threshold has no impact on suicide or all DoD. The same placebo test conducted
in the Spring is repeated in the Fall. Again, there is no evidence of a break. These results
corroborate the conclusion above that the eect in the Spring is driven by the disruption to
sleep patterns, as any eect in the Fall would come entirely from a change in ambient light
exposure.
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Figure 1.6: The Eect Of DST On Suicide and DoD, Fall

Notes: The residuals are from a regressions of log of suicide or all DoD (panels A/C and B/D , respectively) on day-of-week,

month, and year dummy variables. Each point is the average of all residuals for that date relative to the Fall transition date
(Panels A and B ) or the placebo Fall transition date (Panels C and D ). Each point is the average of all residuals for that date
relative to the Fall transition date. Fitted lines are from locally weighted regressions.

The regression results associated with
estimates for suicide alone, while

Figure 1.5 are in Table 1.1. Panel A reveals

Panel B includes all DoD. The preferred specication in

both cases is in Column (1). Here, the Spring transition into DST is associated with a 6.25%
increase in the prevalence of suicide and an 6.59% increase in the prevalence of all DoD.
Both of these results are highly signicant. Columns (2) and (3) replicate the estimates
using alternate bandwidth selectors. For both suicide and all DoD, the results are robust to
these alternative specications.10 Column (4) presents results of the placebo test described
10 They are also robust to alternative kernels, results for which can be found in the appendix,

Tables A1.3
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above.
Table 1.1: The Eect Of DST On Suicide And DoD Using RDD, Spring
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Panel A: suicide
Spring DST

0.0625***
(0.0202)

0.0709***
(0.0240)

0.0713***
(0.0211)

-0.0046
(0.0211)

mserd

cerrd

cersum

mserd

Bandwidth selector

Panel B: all deaths of despair
Spring DST

0.0659***
(0.0018)

0.0811***
(0.0222)

0.0708***
(0.0197)

-0.0028
(0.0153)

mserd

cerrd

cersum

mserd

Bandwidth selector

Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of total deaths due to suicide (Panel A) and all DoD (Panel B ) demeaned

by day-of-week, month, and year. All specications use a local linear regression and a uniform kernel. 1979-1986, the placebo
transition date is assigned using the mechanism from 1987-1988; while the placebo transition date in 1987-1988 is assigned
using the mechanism from 1979-1986. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.
*** Signicant at a 1 percent level
** Signicant at a 5 percent level.
* Signicant at a 10 percent level.

The regression results associated with
estimates for suicide alone, while

Figure 1.6 are in Table 1.2. Panel A reveals

Panel B includes all DoD. The preferred specication in

both cases is in Column (1). Here, the Fall transition into DST is associated with a 0.53
percent increase in the prevalence of suicide and an -0.38 percent decrease in the prevalence
of all DoD. The estimates for both are highly insignicant. Columns (2) and (3) replicate the
estimates using alternate bandwidth selectors, and the results remain small and insignicant
under these alternative specications.11 The placebo test used for the Spring transition is
applied here, as well. Like the Spring, the estimates around the placebo transition date are
and A1.4.

11 They are also robust to alternative kernels, results for which can be found in the appendix,

and A1.4.

Tables A1.3
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small and insignicant.
Table 1.2: The Eect Of DST On Suicide And DoD Using RDD, Fall
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Panel A: suicide
Fall DST
Bandwidth selector

0.0053
(0.0190)

-0.0115
(0.0224)

-0.0150
(0.0246)

-0.0048
(0.0178)

mserd

cerrd

cersum

mserd

Panel B: all deaths of despair
Fall DST
Bandwidth selector

-0.0038
(0.0166)

0.0097
(0.0207)

0.0128
(0.0226)

-0.0076
(0.0172)

mserd

cerrd

cersum

mserd

Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of total deaths due to suicide (Panel A) and all DoD (Panel B ) demeaned

by day-of-week, month, and year. All specications use a local linear regression and a uniform kernel. 1979-1986, the placebo
transition date is assigned using the mechanism from 1987-1988; while the placebo transition date in 1987-1988 is assigned
using the mechanism from 1979-1986. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.
*** Signicant at a 1 percent level
** Signicant at a 5 percent level.
* Signicant at a 10 percent level.

To further test the robustness of these estimates and to put their magnitude in perspective, permutation tests suggested by Smith (2016) are run for all primary specications. This
test uses the same estimating procedure as above for every date and generates a distribution
of estimate coecients. Results are in

Figure 1.7. Here, the vertical red line indicates the

placement of the estimates from Column (1) of
(suicide), the p-value is .10. For

Panels A and B in Table 1.1. For Panel A

Panel B (all DoD), the p-value is also .10. This means the

point estimates at both of these transition dates are relatively large compared to other dates
throughout the year. That the p-value is not lower is understandable. There are likely other
events that impact DoD more than DST, such as the days major holidays or after events like
the World Series or Superbowl. This likelihood notwithstanding, both estimates represent
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outliers.
This procedure is duplicated for the Fall Transition. For

Panel C, the p-value is .83. For

Panel D, the p-value is .90. This is further evidence that the Fall DST transition has no
measurable eect on DoD. There doesn't appear to be anything particularly unique about
the coecient estimates at this particular threshold relative to other dates throughout the
year.
Figure 1.7: Permutation Test For Primary Specications

Notes: These are the result of a permutation test for the primary estimates of DST. The kernel density function uses a uniform

kernel and shows the distribution of coecient estimates for equation (1) for all dates through the year. The vertical red line
represents the true estimate. Panel A is from a regression of suicides alone during the Spring transition. It has a point value of
.0625, and has a p-value of .10. Panel B is from a regression of all DoD for the Spring transition. It has a point value of .0659,
and has a p-value of .10. Panel C is from a regression of suicides alone during the Fall transition. It has a point value of .0053,
and has a p-value of .83. Panel B is from a regression of all DoD for the Fall transition. It has a point value of -.0638, and has
a p-value of .90.

The results for the FE model are in

Table 1.3. Column (1) gives estimates for suicides
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alone while column two includes all DoD. In both cases, estimates are statistically signicant
and qualitatively similar to the RDD results for spDSTdy . However, the magnitude for both
regressions is smaller. For the Fall, the results are again small and insignicant, validating
the ndings from the RDD model.
Table 1.3: The Eect Of DST On Suicide And DoD Using FE Model
(1)

(2)

Spring DST

0.0394**
(0.0174)

0.0292*
(0.0171)

Fall DST

0.0235
(0.0392)

-0.0004
(0.0390)

Constant

4.2290***
(0.0157)

4.388***
(0.0150)

3,653

3,653

N

Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of total deaths due to suicide (Column (1)) and all DoD (Column (2)) demeaned

by day-of-week, month, and year. Spring DST is the eect of the Spring transition on suicide and all DoD, respectively. fall
DST is the eect of the Fall transition on suicide and all DoD, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.

The smaller magnitude of the coecients could be because the eects of sleep loss diminish with time. Indeed, the prevailing literature suggests the eects of a sleep disruption
last approximately a week. Re-estimating Table

1.3 with the inclusion of dummies for being

within a week of the transition in the Spring (spDST 1dy ), the coecient estimates become
much closer to the RDD estimates. These results are in

Table 1.4.
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Table 1.4: The Eect Of DST On Suicide And DoD Using FE Model
(1)

(2)

Spring DST (1)

0.0517**
(0.0220)

0.0454**
(0.0209)

Spring DST (2)

0.0268
(0.0204)

0.0155
(0.0198)

Fall DST (1)

0.0009
(0.0389)

0.0290
(0.0393)

Fall DST (2)

0.0234
(0.0498)

0.0590
(0.0472)

4.2333***
(0.0130)

4.3989***
(0.0121)

3,653

3,653

Constant

N
Notes:

The dependent variable is the natural log of total deaths due to suicide (Column (1)) and all DoD (Column (2))

demeaned by day-of-week, month, and year. Spring DST (1) is the eect of DST on suicide and all DoD, respectively, in the
rst week after the transition. Spring DST (2) is the eect of DST outside the rst week. Fall DST is the eect of the Fall
transition on suicide and all DoD, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.

1.6

Conclusion

DoD has been on the rise over the past twenty years, and it's become increasingly important to understand its triggers and underlying causes. This paper attempts to do that by
addressing how changes in ambient light and disruptions to the circadian rhythm brought
on by DST impacts DoD. DST is unique in that it lends itself well to well to two complementary identication strategies. First, it has two dened thresholds every year that starkly
changes treatment status for everyone in an area where DST is observed, which makes it ideal
an RDD. Using within year variation in this way gives unbiased estimates of local average
treatment eects, but leaves questions about seasonality impacting the results. Second, the
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DST transition date assignment mechanism introduces natural variation in the starting and
stopping days between years, making it equally well suited for analysis with a FE model.
Getting similar results using across year variation in this way helps minimizes any concerns
with the primary specication.
The results from both cases are strongly suggestive of Spring DST transitions having a
large and meaningful impact on DoD. Using multiple bandwidth selectors and kernels, all
RDD estimates suggest the transition increases suicide and all DoD by between 6-8 percent
around the threshold. These estimates are veried with a permutation test, which suggests
the jump in DoD at the Spring DST threshold is an outlier among all days throughout the
year. The results from the FE approach corroborate these results, though the magnitude
found here suggests the jump is between 3-4 percent. The dierence is likely because the
eect of the DST transition is most acute directly after the change, which is more directly
estimated with the RDD.
The results for the Fall DST transitions suggest no impact on DoD. Using multiple
bandwidth selectors and kernels, all RDD estimates remain small and insignicant. Results
from a permutation test suggest there is nothing unique about the change in deaths around
this date relative to other days throughout the year. The results from the FE approach
corroborate these ndings.
Estimates for the Spring can be interpreted as the combined eect of more sun exposure
and less sleep, since there is more ambient light during the waking hours and people sleep
on average 32-40 minutes less at the transition. Estimates for the Fall can be interpreted as
the impact of less light exclusively, since there is no evidence of people sleeping more despite
the day having an extra hour. Since there is no evidence of any eect during the Fall, the
jump in fatalities around the Spring DST can be attributed to loses in sleep exclusively.
This paper adds to a thread of literature on the adverse eects of the Spring DST transition. In addition to the ndings here, evidence suggests it does not accomplish its primary
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objective of saving energy (Momani et al. 2009; Krarti and Hajiah, 2011; Kotchen and Grant,
2011; Sexton and Beatty, 2014); it increases automobile crashes by 5.6 percent (Smith, 2016);
and it increases robberies by 7 percent; among other potentially negative outcomes. Interestingly, there is some evidence for positive eect of ambient light exposure around the Fall
transition. For example, there is some evidence that it helps reduce crime (Doleac and
Sanders, 2015) and encourage exercise (Wol and Makino, 2013). Combined, the policy
implication from this paper and others in this vein is to abandon yearly DST transitions and
remain on DST all year. This would eliminate the deleterious eects of sleep loss during
the Spring transition while allowing more ambient light exposure through the evenings year
round.
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Appendix

Table A1.1: The Eect Of DST On Factors Related To DoD

DST
Bandwidth selector

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.0024
(0.0128)

-0.0107
(0.0139)

-0.0337
(0.1270)

0.0612
(0.1330)

mserd

mserd

mserd

mserd

Notes : The dependent variable is the natural log of closing NASDAQ price (Columns (1) and (2)) and inches of precipitation

(Columns (3) and (4)) demeaned by day-of-week, month, and year. All specications use a local linear regression and a uniform
kernel. DST is the eect of the Spring DST transition in the Spring for Columns (1) and (3). DST is the eect of the Fall DST
transition for Columns (2) and (4). Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.
*** Signicant at a 1 percent level
** Signicant at a 5 percent level.
* Signicant at a 10 percent level.
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Table A1.2: The Eect Of DST On Suicide And DoD Using RDD, Epanechnikov Kernels
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Panel A: suicide
Spring DST

0.0542***
(0.0173)

0.0716***
(0.0210)

0.0685***
(0.0200)

-0.0128
(0.0149)

Panel B: all deaths of despair
Spring DST

0.0722***
(0.0166)

0.0730***
(0.0218)

0.0728***
(0.0191)

-0.0155
(0.0138)

Panel C: suicide
Fall DST

-0.0049
(0.0416)

-0.0231
(0.0493)

-0.0126
(0.0391)

0.0251
(0.0455)

Panel D: all deaths of despair
Fall DST
Bandwidth selector

0.0085
(0.0415)

0.0040
(0.0501)

0.0000
(0.0384)

0.0152
(0.0352)

mserd

cerrd

cersum

mserd

Notes : The dependent variable is the natural log of total deaths to to suicide (Panel A) and all DoD (Panel B ) demeaned by

day-of-week, month, and year. All specications use epanechnikov kernel. DST is the eect of the Spring DST transition on
suicide and all DoD for Panel A and B , respectively. DST is the eect of the Fall DST transition on suicide and all DoD for
Panel C and D , respectively. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.

*** Signicant at a 1 percent level
** Signicant at a 5 percent level.
* Signicant at a 10 percent level.
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Table A1.3: The Eect Of DST On Suicide And DoD Using RDD, No Adjustment
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Panel A: suicide
Spring DST

0.0557***
(0.0196)

0.0704***
(0.0233)

0.0647***
(0.0211)

-0.0082
(0.0168)

Panel B: all deaths of despair
Spring DST

0.0598***
(0.0182)

0.0667***
(0.0228)

0.0669***
(0.0201)

-0.0079
(0.0155)

Panel C: suicide
Fall DST

-0.0052
(0.0169)

0.0095
(0.0209)

-0.0075
(0.0246)

-0.0010
(0.0180)

Panel D: all deaths of despair
Fall DST
Bandwidth selector

0.0014
(0.0162)

0.0153
(0.0198)

0.0153
(0.0207)

-0.0086
(0.0166)

mserd

cerrd

cersum

mserd

Notes : The dependent variable is the natural log of total deaths to to suicide (Panel A and C ) and all DoD (Panel B and

D) demeaned by day-of-week, month, and year.

Here, there is no adjustment for hours per day at the transition date.

All

specications use a local linear regression and a uniform kernel. DST is the eect of the Spring DST transition on suicide and
all DoD for Panel A and B , respectively. DST is the eect of the Fall DST transition on suicide and all DoD for Panel C and
D , respectively. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.

*** Signicant at a 1 percent level
** Signicant at a 5 percent level.
* Signicant at a 10 percent level.
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Table A1.4: The Eect Of DST On Suicide And DoD Using RDD, Triangular Kernels
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Panel A: suicide
Spring DST

0.0554***
(0.0175)

0.0687***
(0.0212)

0.0677***
(0.0201)

-0.0131
(0.0149)

Panel B: all deaths of despair
Spring DST

0.0693***
(0.0182)

0.0687***
(0.0220)

0.0698***
(0.0194)

-0.0159
(0.0139)

Panel C: suicide
Fall DST

-0.0085
(0.0416)

-0.0179
(0.0493)

-0.0133
(0.0396)

0.0288
(0.0476)

Panel D: all deaths of despair
Fall DST
Bandwidth selector

0.0082
(0.0420)

0.0077
(0.0508)

-0.0005
(0.0380)

0.0315
(0.0385)

mserd

cerrd

cersum

mserd

Notes : The dependent variable is the natural log of total deaths to to suicide (Panel A) and all DoD (Panel B ) demeaned

by day-of-week, month, and year. All specications use triangular kernel. DST is the eect of the Spring DST transition on
suicide and all DoD for Panel A and B , respectively. DST is the eect of the Fall DST transition on suicide and all DoD for
Panel C and D , respectively. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.

*** Signicant at a 1 percent level
** Signicant at a 5 percent level.
* Signicant at a 10 percent level.

Chapter 2
Fouled Out: NBA Referees,
Discrimination, And Public Awareness
2.1

Introduction

Research on labor market discrimination is typically done by comparing outcomes for dierent groups and attributing the dierences unexplained by productivity gaps to discrimination. This sort of procedure is prone to some limitations. For example, while the researcher
usually knows the race of each employee, they are unlikely to know the racial composition of
the employers, co-workers, or other individuals with whom they interact in the labor market.
Even more problematic, individual level productivity is hard to measure, and proxies like
education and experience can be noisy. The goal of this paper is to estimate the magnitude
of own-race preference in a setting where these problems are minimized: professional basketball. In particular, this paper will consider own-race bias among referees in the National
Basketball Association (NBA).
Professional basketball is particularly well-suited for this analysis for a number of reasons.
First, sports leagues keep meticulous and precise statistics. Every interaction is recorded on
30
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a game-by-game basis, meaning player productivity is measured exactly and updated in real
time. Second, referees are assigned to each game randomly with respect to race, which makes
for easy identication. They are also under constant evaluation, with promotion, pay, and
employment dependent on their performance. This means they have considerable incentive
to be as accurate as possible, which suggests that any evidence of bias in this setting should
represent a lower bound for racial bias in society more broadly.
This is not the rst time these observations have been made, and the literature on
discrimination in sports is understandably robust. For example, Nardinelli and Simon (1990)
consider consumer discrimination by looking at the impact of a player's race on the price
for their trading cards, and nd evidence of discrimination against black players. Similarly,
Kanazawa and Funk (2007) nd evidence from the Nielsen ratings that viewership increases
when there are more white athletes playing. Using cross-sectional variation, Christiano
(1988) nds no evidence of salary discrimination for baseball players. However, using quantile
regression, Holmes (2011) nds evidence for salary discrimination against black players in
the lower half of the salary distribution.
Research directly related to referees is more limited. Parsons, Sulaeman, Yates, and
Hamermesh (2011) looks at racial bias among umpires in baseball. After controlling for
umpire, pitcher, batter, and catcher xed eects, the authors nd that strikes are more
likely to be called if the umpire and pitcher match race. They also nd evidence that
monitoring systems deter this behavior. Tainsky, Mills, and Winfree (2013) reproduce this
analysis and get mixed results that are highly sensitive to specication, methodology, time
period, and choice of race categories.
There is also research specically on referees discrimination in professional basketball.
Price and Wolfers (2010) do this by measuring foul call frequency relative to the racial
make-up of the ociating crew. In doing this, they nd that players have up to 4.583
percent more fouls called against them when faced with referees of a dierent race. Mongeon
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and Longley (2013) reproduce Price and Wolfers (2010), but alter the model to include the
interaction of the eight player-race and referee-mix indicator variables. They conclude that
it's black players alone that are discriminated against. After garnering considerably media
attention, Pope, Price, and Wolfers (2018) revisit their earlier work and estimate the impact
that awareness and attention had on bias. Consistent with Parsons, Sulaeman, Yates, and
Hamermesh (2011), they nd that the increased scrutiny decreased the magnitude of racial
bias.
Price and Wolfers (2010), Mongeon and Longley (2013), and Pope, Price, and Wolfers
(2018) present compelling results with the resources available to them. However, they are
also constrained by their data sets. For one, while they know the racial make-up of each
referee crew, they do not know the identity of the particular referees making each call. They
also do not know call accuracy and are forced to proxy it with call frequency. Black and
white players dier on nearly every observable dimension, and it could be that there are some
unobserved player characteristics that that drives the results. Lastly, they do not know the
race of the opposing player. As such, they cannot control for all the racial dynamics at play
with any player/referee interaction.
This paper adds to this previous research by taking advantage of two unique data sets.
The rst of these is the NBA's play-by-play data, which recently began reporting the specic
referee making each foul call. The second of these is an NBA's Last Two Minute Reports
(LTMR), which describe the correctness of all calls and material non-calls during the last
two minutes of close games. These reports also reveal the name, and therefore the race, of
the disadvantaged player in each interaction. With this data, this paper exploits the random
assignment of referees to determine the magnitude of their racial bias. In doing so, the
evidence suggests that both black and white referees exhibit own-race preference, that this
preference is most pronounced in close games, and that public monitoring all but eliminates
the bias.

CHAPTER 2.

NBA REFEREES, DISCRIMINATION, AND PUBLIC AWARENESS

33

The rest of this paper is organized as follows: (2)

Referees in the NBA describes the

random way referees are tasked to particular games (3)

Data describes the data, its restric-

tions, and the features that make it suited for this analysis; (4)

Empirical Strategy outlines

the identication strategy and the assumptions required for unbiased results; (5)

Results

presents results and robustness checks; and (6) Conclusion summarizes the salient outcomes
and discusses their implications.

2.2

Referees In The NBA

Since the 1988-1989 season, each NBA game has been ociated by three referees, called the
Crew Chief, Referee, and Umpire. The Crew Chief is the leader on and o the court and
is responsible for making nal determinations on any disputed calls. S/he, along with the
Referee, handle communication between other ocials and the teams. The Umpire has no
responsibilities outside accurately making calls. However, in terms of performance directly
related to game play, the responsibilities and expectations of each ocial is the same.
Referee crews are chosen from a pool of between sixty to seventy; and once selected,
stay together for a brief period before being re-assigned. The exact position each referee is
assigned to is based on experience and performance. To reduce any potential bias, the NBA
limits each referee to nine games per team and prohibits more than one assignment per city
within the same two week window. They also limit each referee to 75 total games and try
to balance experience within each three person team. These restrictions are not particularly
problematic for the purposes of this study, as they are not related to the races of the referees
or teams. So, while assignment is not random, strictly speaking, it is random with respect
to race.1
1 Evidence supporting this claim is in the

Empirical Strategy section.
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Referee crews are subject to considerable supervision and oversight. Before each game,
they meet with an observer from the referee operations sta and discuss potential issues
related to the upcoming match. After the game concludes, they reconvene, review video,
and discuss performance. The observer then reports to the director of ociating, who issues bi-weekly performance evaluations for each referee. Coaches also provide feedback each
game and more comprehensively in a mid-season report. Finally, the league's referee operations sta, using input from coaches and data on call accuracy, issue end-of-season report
that ranks the pool of referees in terms of overall performance. These reports determine
the 36 ocials who are included in the pool available for playo games, thereby providing
considerable incentive to be as accurate as possible.

2.3

Data

There are two sources of game-level data in this paper. The rst of these is the NBA's
play-by-play data for the seasons 2014/2015 until 2018/2019, allowing analysis from 6,449
games and 128,047 player-game observations. These years were chosen because they are
most recent and because they overlap with the second data source, described below, which
has only been available since 2014/2015. This source gives a moment-by-moment account
of every event that occurs throughout each game. This information is aggregated to the
player-game level, yielding a box score that include all performance statistics including
points, rebounds, assists, blocks, steals, minutes played, and the number of personal fouls
committed. These reports also list the three referees ociating the game, the location where
the game is being played, and the total number of fans in attendance.
For the 2014/2015 to 2017/2018 seasons, the NBA does not reveal which referee makes
each foul call, only that a foul is called. This is why previous research, like Price and Wolfers
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(2010), relies on the fraction of referees that are white as an explanatory variable instead
of the race of the ocial making the call. Starting in 2018/2019, however, the NBA began
reporting the specic referee that makes each foul call. So, for 1,312 games and 19,213
player-games, and the data include information on the total number of fouls called by black
and white referees individually. This data source represents an important improvement over
data used in previous literature, which relies on the fraction of referees that are white as an
explanatory variable instead of the race of the referee actually making the call.
The second source of game-level data comes from the NBA's Last Two Minute Report
(LTMR). The NBA began releasing these reports for purposes of transparency starting midway through the 2014/2015 season. Every game where teams are within three points of each
other at any point in the last two minutes of the game is reviewed by a third party and
and their ndings are released for public scrutiny the following day. All calls and non-calls
during the last two minutes are evaluated, including defensive fouls, oensive fouls, agrant
fouls, technical fouls, travels, double-dribbles, out of bounds, 5 second inbound violations,
8 second back court violations, 10 second free-throw violations, 24 second shot clock violations, jump balls, kick balls, oensive lane violations, defensive lane violations, oensive goal
tending, and defensive goal tending. In all cases, the NBA's League Operations senior management team identies the oending player and the disadvantaged player and evaluates the
correctness of the call or non-call.

2

This data source represents an important improvement

over data used in previous literature in two ways. First, since the correctness of a call can
be measured directly, it does not need to be proxied with foul frequency. Second, previous
literature is unable to account for the race of the disadvantaged player, an important piece
of nearly every interpersonal interaction on the court.
Season-level team statistics, including coach, record, and playo status; season-level
2 Note that there is not always a disadvantaged player. For example, if a travel or double dribble were
called, there is a player committing an infraction, but no specic opposing player is disadvantaged.
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player statistics, including points, rebounds, assists, blocks, and steals; and time-invariant
player characteristics, such as height, weight, and position, come from basketball-reference.com.
This information is available for the 2014/2015 season through the 2018/2019 season and is
merged with both game-level data sets described above.
Indicator variables for referee, player, and coach race come from a variety of sources.
Player and coach race come from Price and Wolfers (2010), Groothuis and Hill (2013), and
visual inspection of press photographs. Following precedent in previous literature, a person's
race in dened reductively as appearing black or appearing white. Someone with Hispanic
ethnicity can appear in either category. For example, Al Horford, who is Dominican, is
coded as black; Marc Gasol, who is Spanish, is coded as white. Asian players are not well
represented in the NBA and have been removed from the data set. The vast majority of
referee races are borrowed from Price and Wolfers (2010), who determined race by visual
inspection of press photographs with the aid of a former NBA referee. The referees not in
their data set are coded based on the author's visual inspection of press photographs. The
rubric for determining the race of a referee is the same as it is for players.

2.4

Empirical Strategy

The empirical approach in this paper relies on cross-sectional variation and the random
assignment of referees. To get valid results using this approach, three conditions need to
be met. First, referees must be assigned randomly. According to the league this is true, at
least with respect to race. Apart from the assignment restrictions described in the previous
section, referee crew assignments are completely arbitrary and are not inuenced by the
composition of either team. Evidence that this condition is met is in

Table 2.1, which shows

the percent of minutes played by black players in games ociated by zero, one, two, and
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three referees for each season in the data set. Column (5) reports the p-value for an Ftest of a regression of the average minutes played by black players on the number of white
referees. This is important because the league knows the racial composition of teams prior to
assigning referees. If there is a systematic relationship it would cast doubt that assignment
is truly random. The p-values reveal that the season level racial composition of teams have
no explanatory power over the number of white referees assigned to games, except perhaps
in 2017. Overall, there is little evidence that the league adjusts the racial composition of
their referee crews to match the make-up of the teams they ociate.
Table 2.1: Referee Racial Composition And Black Player Minutes
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0 white
referees

1 white
referees

2 white
referees

3 white
referees

p-value

Percent minutes by black players
2014/2015
2015/2016
2016/2017
2017/2018
2018/2019

77.7480
81.1247
79.7251
81.7192
86.5524

78.6037
80.0631
79.8247
80.6496
86.4159

78.8522
80.4230
80.0264
82.2733
86.7653

78.2151
80.5973
80.0463
80.6576
86.2934

0.7850
0.6049
0.0717
0.5534
0.9482

N

1,148
8.9006

4,432
34.3619

5,204
40.3473

2,114
16.3901

12,898
100

% of games

Notes: Each observation is a teamxgame observation. Sample includes all regular season and playo games from 2014/2015

until 2018/2019.

Each cell represents the percent of minutes played by black players in games ociated by zero, one, two,

or three white referees. The minute distribution is known by the NBA prior to referee assignment, so if referees are assigned
randomly with respect to race there should be no dierence across rows. The nal column tests this hypothesis. It reports the
p-value for an F-test of a regression of the average minutes played by black players on the number of white referees.

Identication also requires that teams do not adjust their lineups in response to the
racial composition of the ocials in each specic game. Ocial assignments are reported at
9:00pm EST the day before a game is played, so it's possible that teams could adjust their
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Table 2.2 tests this hypothesis by comparing the

number of black starters when faced with crews of zero, one, two, and three white referees.
Column (5) tests the hypothesis that the number of white referees is independent of the
number of black starters. For every year, there is no evidence that this null is true, with the
exception of 2018. Overall, this suggests teams do not change their line-ups to accommodate
any expected bias from referees.
Table 2.2: Referee Racial Composition And The Number Of Black Starters
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0 white
referees

1 white
referees

2 white
referees

3 white
referees

p-value

Number of black starters
2014/2015
2015/2016
2016/2017
2017/2018
2018/2019

3.9434
4.0696
4.0504
4.1210
4.4000

3.8961
4.0244
4.0177
4.0022
4.370

3.9246
4.0115
4.1049
4.1212
4.4323

3.9798
4.0266
3.9663
4.1071
4.3762

0.8714
0.1937
0.1282
0.0802
0.2947

N

1,148
8.9006

4,432
34.3619

5,204
40.3473

2,114
16.3901

12,898
100

% of games

Notes: Each observation is a teamxgame observation. Sample includes all regular season and playo games from 2014/2015

until 2018/2019. Each cell represents average number of black starters in games ociated by zero, one, two, or three white
referees. The referee crew is known to teams by 9:00pm EST the night prior to each game, so if teams do not adjust their
lineups in response to referee assignment then there should be no dierence across rows. The nal column tests this hypothesis.
It reports the p-value for a chi-square test for independence. where the null hypothesis is that the number of white referees is
independent to the number of black starters.

Third, valid results require any dierences in performance between black and white players to be adequately controlled for.

Table 2.3 gives an overview of many of the dierences

between the two groups. With few exceptions, there are statistically signicant dierences
in all performance measures between black and white players. Luckily, basketball keeps
particularly robust records of statistics related to performance and physical attributes,
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Black
players

sd

White
players

sd

Dierence

p-value

0.0927
3.1651
0.6716
5.8533

0.0017
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

Panel A: raw statistics
Fouls
Minutes
Games
Games started

2.1543
26.3346
65.0212
41.4104

1.4389
7.1625
17.5782
29.9859

2.2470
23.1695
64.3496
35.5572

1.4403
6.7739
17.2355
29.8507

Panel B: per 48 minute statistics
Foul rate
Points
Rebounds
Assists
Steals
Blocks
Turnovers

3.9267
21.2448
8.3993
4.7199
1.6003
0.9561
2.7296

1.2022
6.6628
3.9489
2.9348
0.5859
0.8678
1.0996

4.3655
19.6844
10.0974
4.0097
1.2812
1.0197
2.6122

1.3555
5.1119
4.3187
2.4998
0.5464
0.8319
0.8142

-0.4388
1.5604
-1.6982
0.7102
0.3192
-0.0636
0.1174

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

Panel C: player characteristics
Age
Height (cm)
Weight (kg)
Center
Power forward
Small forward
Shooting
guard
Point guard
Starter
All star

26.4127
198.9419
97.1908
0.1389
0.1856
0.1914
0.2536

4.004
8.6356
11.4237
0.3459
0.3888
0.3934
0.4351

27.4366
206.2824
104.6314
0.3654
0.2390
0.1427
0.1411

4.489
8.0067
10.6653
0.4816
0.4265
0.3498
0.3482

-0.8663
-7.6540
-7.9488
-0.2243
-0.0534
0.0487
0.1124

0.0049
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

0.2305
0.6372
0.1268

0.4211
0.4808
0.3327

0.1117
0.5575
0.0452

0.1411
0.4967
0.2078

0.1187
0.0797
0.0816

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

Notes: Reported here are summary statistics for black and white players, the dierences between them, and a p-value for a

dierence in means test. Standard deviations are listed next to each group mean.

so these dierences can be appropriated accounted for. Game and team summary statistics,
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Table A2.1, reveal much more modest dierences between black and

white players.

2.5

Results

2.5.1 Referee Bias
The rst estimating equation follows Price and Wolfers (2010) and acts as a benchmark
against which other results are measured. This specication asks if having more opposite
race referees impacts the number of fouls called against a player.
The estimating equation is:

f oul48itgr = β0 +β1 %whiteref g · black i +β2 %whiteref g +β3 black i +β4 P i +β4 T t +γi +δr +sg +uitgr
(2.1)
where the subscripts denote a player

i playing for a team t in a specic game g ociated

by referees r. The dependent variable, f oul48itgr , equals the number of fouls called on a
player per 48 minutes; %whiterefg is the fraction of referees that are white; blacki is a
dummy variable equaling 1 if a player is black and zero if they are white; Pi is a matrix
of individual-level, time varying performance statistics, Tt is a matrix of team-level, time
varying characteristics; γi is a vector of individual xed eects; and sg is a vector of common
time eects. The coecient of interest is β1 , which can be interpreted as the eect of having
opposite-race referees on a player's foul rate. In addition to the assumptions described in the
previous section, this model relies on the assumption that any additional fouls that occur
when there are more opposite race referees actually come from those additional opposite-race
referees.
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Results for this specication are in Table 2.4. All specications include controls for season

average player statistics, including fouls, points, defensive rebounds, oensive rebounds, assists, blocks, fouls, steals, turnovers, free-throw attempts and makes, two-point attempts and
makes, three-point attempts and makes, free-throw shooting percentage, two-point shooting
percentage, three-point shooting percentage, and minutes played (these statistics are measured per 48 minutes, as applicable); and controls for player characteristics, including all-star
status, starting status, height, weight, position, experience, and age. They also include team
and game controls, including home game status, win status, points scored by each team,
team and opponent playo status, coach and opponent coach race, and attendance. Finally,
all specications include referee and season xed eects. Column two adds player xed effects to absorb any unaccounted for, time-invariant player characteristics. Column three also
interacts player statistics with % white referees, reecting the possibility that player role and
performance might be inuenced by the racial composition of the referee crew.
Regardless of specication, the estimates are positive and are of similar magnitude,
though are no longer signicant once player statistics are interacted with referee race. These
results indicate that having three opposite race referees is associated with a 2.550-3.4731
percent increase in foul frequency, relative to having no opposite race referees. This outcome
is qualitatively similar to Price and Wolfers (2010), which nds a 4.0862-4.5830 percent
increase in foul frequency between the 1991/1992 and 2003/2004 seasons. The estimates
here are also considerably smaller magnitude and signicance. This is consistent with a
downward trend that is evident since at least 2007. This observation is rst noted in Pope,
Price, and Wolfers (2018), which attribute the decline to the awareness their earlier paper
generated. This trend is displayed visually in

Figure 2.1, which plots the point estimate for

the coecient of interest over time.3
3 These estimates are generated using the most parsimonious specication in

Table 2.4 in Column (1).

The dashed lines above and below the point estimates are the 95% condence interval bounds.

Figures

related to Columns (2) and (3) are in the appendix Figures A2.1 and A2.2 , respectively. Each point uses a
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Table 2.4: The Eect Of Opposite Race Referees On Foul Rate, 2014/2015-2018/2019
(1)

(2)

(3)

Dep var: (total fouls)×(48)/(minutes)
mean=4.031; sd=3.193
(Blk plr)×(% wht ref)

0.1403**
(0.0689)

0.1397**
(0.0692)

0.1028
(0.073)

Controls







Player stats
Player characteristics
Team characteristics
Opponent characteristics
Game characteristics
Player FE
Ref FE
Season FE
(Stats)×(% wht ref)

N
Notes:























128,047

128,047

128,047

Observations are at the playergame level and are weighted by minutes played.

and are clustered at the game level.

Standard errors are in parenthesis

Each column reports the results of a separate regression.

All specications include

controls for season average player statistics, including fouls, points, defensive rebounds, oensive rebounds, assists, blocks,
fouls, steals, turnovers, free-throw attempts and makes, two-point attempts and makes, three-point attempts and makes, freethrow shooting percentage, two-point shooting percentage, three-point shooting percentage, and minutes played (per 48 minutes
played, as applicable); and controls for player characteristics, including all-star status, starting status, height, weight, position,
experience, and age.

They also all include team and game controls, including home game status, win status, points scored

by each team, team and opponent playo status, coach and opponent coach race, and attendance. Finally, all specications
include referee and season xed eects.

Column (2) adds player xed eects to absorb any unaccounted for, time-invariant

player characteristics. Column (3) also interacts player statistics with % white referees, noting that player performance more
broadly may change in the presence of more white referees.
*** Signicant at a 1 percent level
** Signicant at a 5 percent level.
* Signicant at a 10 percent level.

three year sample centered at the year in question.
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Figure 2.1: The Eect Of Opposite Race Referees On Foul Rate Over Time, 1991/19922018/2019

Notes: Point estimates over time using the most parsimonious specication from Table 2.1 . The dashed lines above and below

the point estimates are the 95 percent condence interval. Figures related to Columns (2) and (3) are in in the appendix Figure
A2.1 and A2.2 , respectively.

One drawback of the preceding analysis is that it lacks precision. It gives some evidence
that having more opposite race referees increases a player's foul rate, but it does not make
it clear where those fouls come from. It's assumed that they come from the opposite race
referees, but it cannot conrm that conclusively. It's possible that ocials become more
strict with players of their own race when paired with opposite race referees, and this is
what drives the disparity.
Luckily, starting in the 2018-2019 season, the NBA began reporting the specic referee
making each call in their play-by-play reporting. By aggregating these data to the game
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level, this added information makes it possible to calculate the total number of fouls called
on a player by white and black referees separately each game. By extension, this makes it
possible to see if player race impacts the proportion of fouls called by referees of either race.
This estimating equation is:

f oul48ratioitgr = β0 + β1 black i + β2 %whiteref g + β3 P it + β4 T t + δr + uitgr

(2.2)

where the subscripts are as previously described. The dependent variable, f oul48ratioigrt ,
is a ratio of the number of fouls called on player i by white referees per 48 minutes divided by
the total number of fouls called against them by all referees per 48 minutes. The coecient
of interest is β1 and can be interpreted as the change in the proportion of calls made by
opposite race referees relative to opposite race players, holding the number of opposite race
referees constant.
Results are in Table 2.5. In all specications, the same season-level player statistics, game
controls, and team controls in

Table 2.4 are included. Referee xed eects and controls for

the racial composition of the referee crew are also included for all three specications. Since
player xed-eects would absorb the blacki variable, they are necessarily excluded. Season
xed eects are also removed, as the entire data set is from one season.
As before, the estimates are consistently positive and marginally signicant. They are
also similar in magnitude and indicate that the proportion of fouls called by referees of a
particular race increase 1.6689 to 2.3326 percent when a player is of the opposite race. These
corroborate the ndings in Table 2.4 and give support for the assumption that the additional
fouls observed when there are more opposite race referee actually come from those additional
opposite-race referees.
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Table 2.5: The Eect of Opposite Race Referees on Foul Ratio, 2018/2019
(1)

(2)

(3)

Dep var: (fouls by white referees)/(total fouls by all referees)
mean=0.5273; sd=0.4210
Black player

0.0123*
(0.0069)

0.0096
(0.0074)

0.0088
(0.0072)

Controls
Player stats
Player characteristics
Team characteristics
Opponent characteristics
Game characteristics
Player FE
Ref FE
Season FE
(Stats)×(% wht ref)

N
























19,213

19,213

19,213

Notes: Observations are at the playergame level and are weighted by minutes played. Standard errors are in parenthesis and

are clustered at the game level. Each column reports the results of a separate regression. All specications include controls
for season average player statistics, including fouls, points, defensive rebounds, oensive rebounds, assists, blocks, fouls, steals,
turnovers, free-throw attempts and makes, two-point attempts and makes, three-point attempts and makes, free-throw shooting
percentage, two-point shooting percentage, three-point shooting percentage, and minutes played (per 48 minutes played, as
applicable). They also include team and game controls, including home game status, win status, points scored by each team,
team and opponent playo status, coach and opponent coach race, and attendance. Finally, all specications include referee
xed eects. No specication includes player xed eects, as they would absorb the variable of interest. Season xed eects
are also omitted, as the sample is restricted to one season. Column (2) adds controls for player characteristics, including allstar status, starting status, height, weight, position, experience, and age. Column (3) interacts player statistics with % white
referees, noting that player performance more broadly may change in the presence of more white referees.
*** Signicant at a 1 percent level
** Signicant at a 5 percent level.
* Signicant at a 10 percent level.

CHAPTER 2.

NBA REFEREES, DISCRIMINATION, AND PUBLIC AWARENESS

46

Another advantage of the 2018/2019 data is that it allows investigation into the source
of the bias. As of yet, it is unclear if it is driven by black referees, white referees, or if both
groups exhibit own-race preference. As such, these results are replicated twice more, but
instead of using the foul ratio as a dependent variable, the foul frequency from black and
white referees individually is used.
These estimating equations are:

wf oul48itgr = β0 + β1 black i + β2 %whiterefg + β3 Pit + β4 T t + δr + sg + uigrt

(2.3)

bf oul48itgr = α0 + α1 whitei + α2 %blackrefg + α3 Pit + α4 Tt + δr + sg + uigrt

(2.4)

where the subscripts are as previously described. The dependent variables, wf oul48igrt
and bf oul48igrt , are the number of fouls called on a player per 48 minutes by white referees and black referees, respectively. The coecients of interest are β1 and α1 . β1 can be
interpreted as the additional number of fouls called by white referees per 48 minutes when
a player is black. α1 can be interpreted as the additional number of fouls called by black
referees per 48 minutes when a player is white.
Results for these specications are in Table
described in

2.6, where the controls in each column are as

Table 2.5. As before, the estimates are consistently positive, indicating an own

race bias for both white and black referees.4 In particular, they suggest that being black is
4 These results are in contrast with Mongeon and Longley (2013), which only found evidence of racial
preference for white referees.

CHAPTER 2.

NBA REFEREES, DISCRIMINATION, AND PUBLIC AWARENESS

47

lk
Table 2.6: The Eect Of Race On Fouls From Opposite Race Referees, 2018/2019
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Dependent variable
(white fouls)×(48)/(min)
mean=2.450; sd=2.552
Black player
White player

.08853** 0.0726 0.0753
(.0443) (0.0480) (0.0477)

(5)

(6)

Dependent variable
(black fouls)×(48)/(min)
mean=2.277; sd=2.588

0.0792* 0.0686 0.0693
(0.0451) (0.0475) (0.0466)

Controls
Player stats
Player characteristics
Team characteristics
Opponent characteristics
Game characteristics
Player FE
Ref FE
Season FE
(Stats)×(% wht ref)
(Stats)×(% blk ref)

N
















































19,213

19,213

19,213


19,213

19,213

19,213

Notes: Observations are at the playergame level and are weighted by minutes played. Standard errors are in parenthesis and

are clustered at the game level. Each column reports the results of a separate regression. All specications include controls for
season average player statistics, including fouls, points, defensive rebounds, oensive rebounds, assists, blocks steals, turnovers,
free-throw attempts and makes, two-point attempts and makes, three-point attempts and makes, free-throw shooting percentage,
two-point shooting percentage, three-point shooting percentage, and minutes played (per 48 minutes played, as applicable).
They also include team and game controls, including home game status, win status, points scored by each team, team and
opponent playo status, coach and opponent coach race, and attendance. Finally, all specications include referee xed eects.
No specication includes player xed eects, as they would absorb the variable of interest. Season xed eects are also omitted,
as the sample is restricted to one season. Columns (2) and (5) add controls for player characteristics, including all-star status,
starting status, height, weight, position, experience, and age. Column (3) interacts player statistics with % white referees while
Column (6) interacts player statistics with % black referees, noting that player performance more broadly may change in the
presence of more opposite race referees.
*** Signicant at a 1 percent level
** Signicant at a 5 percent level.
* Signicant at a 10 percent level.

CHAPTER 2.

NBA REFEREES, DISCRIMINATION, AND PUBLIC AWARENESS

48

associated with receiving 2.9633-3.6135 percent more fouls from white referees, holding the
number of white referees constant; while being white is associated with receiving 3.01253.4780 percent more fouls from black referees, holding the number of black referees constant.
For both groups, the results are only marginally signicant.

2.5.2 Referee Bias Under Monitoring
The results thus far are consistently suggestive of own-race bias. However, the magnitudes
are smaller than estimates in previous studies. During Price and Wolfers (2010)'s study
period of 1991/1992 through 2003/2004, the estimates are nearly twice what they are using
a specications comparable to equation (1). This is not a surprising result, however. In a
follow-up to Price and Wolfers (2010), Pope, Price, and Wolfers (2018) nd that bias largely
disappears in the years after Price and Wolfers (2010) was published. They attribute this to
Price and Wolfers (2010)'s widespread media coverage, which brought awareness of the issue
to the NBA.5 This conclusion is consistent with the wider literature in cognitive behavior,
where there are many instances where making conscious a subconscious bias mitigates the
expression of that bias (Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, and Yzerbyt, 2000; Blair, 2002). These
results remain consistent in the current period, as well, which can be seen in Table

2.7. This

table extends the work in Pope, Price, and Wolfers (2018) to include more post-treatment
seasons, and reveals a dramatic drop in eect size for the years after 2007.

5 Over one hundred newspapers, seven TV programs, and 25 radio shows ran pieces on the Price and
Wolfers (2010). The NBA even hired an analytics rm so they could issue a rebuttal

CHAPTER 2.

NBA REFEREES, DISCRIMINATION, AND PUBLIC AWARENESS

49

Table 2.7: The Eect Of Opposite Referees on Foul Rate Before And After PW, 1991/19922018/2019
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

1992-2006 seasons

(5)

(6)

2007-2019 seasons

Dependent variable: (total fouls)×(48)/(minutes)
mean=4.5432; sd=2.552
mean=4.067; sd=2.242
(Blk plr)×(% wht ref)

0.2141***0.2254***0.2132***
(0.0576) (0.0587) (.06143)

0.0717
0.073
0.0540
(0.0526) (0.0528) (0.05617)

Controls
Player stats
Player characteristics
Team characteristics
Opponent characteristics
Game characteristics
Player FE
Ref FE
Season FE
(Stats)×(% wht ref)

N








312,517









312,517










312,517








309,224









309,224










309,224

Notes: Observations are at the playergame level and are weighted by minutes played. Standard errors are in parenthesis and

are clustered at the game level. Each column reports the results of a separate regression. All specications include controls
for season average player statistics, including fouls, points, defensive rebounds, oensive rebounds, assists, blocks, fouls, steals,
turnovers, free-throw attempts and makes, two-point attempts and makes, three-point attempts and makes, free-throw shooting
percentage, two-point shooting percentage, three-point shooting percentage, and minutes played (per 48 minutes played, as
applicable); and controls for player characteristics, including all-star status, starting status, height, weight, position, experience,
and age. They also all include team and game controls, including home game status, win status, points scored by each team,
team and opponent playo status, coach and opponent coach race, and attendance. Finally, all specications include referee
and season xed eects. Columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) add player xed eects to absorb any unaccounted for, time-invariant
player characteristics. Columns (3) and (6) also interacts player statistics with %white referees, noting that player performance
more broadly may change in the presence of more white referees.
*** Signicant at a 1 percent level
** Signicant at a 5 percent level.
* Signicant at a 10 percent level.

Further proof that monitoring impacts bias comes from the LTMR, which have been
distributed since 2014/2015 whenever a game is within three or fewer points at any juncture
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in the last two minutes of the fourth quarter (or overtime). These reports are important
because they extend the already substantial oversight referees receive. Also, unlike other
types of oversight, they are public, much like the media coverage Price and Wolfers (2010)
generated.
Recall that the LTMR not only considers calls during the last two minutes. It also
evaluates all instances where a call conceivably could be made but is not. This allows
creation of a dummy variable, callitgr , that equals 1 whenever a call is made and 0 whenever
a call is not made. With this information, a bivariate analogue to equation (1) can be
estimated using the LTMR.
The results for this model are in

Table 2.8. Interestingly, the coecient of interest is

extremely small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Based on these data, there is
no evidence of racial bias.6 This is alarming, as it is starkly in contrast with estimates in

Table 2.4, despite the only substantive dierence being the choice of sample. This is very
similar to the results in Parsons, Sulaeman, Yates, and Hamermesh (2011), which argue that
increasing the visibility of the biased party's behavior increases the cost of expressing that
bias. They test this hypothesis by evaluating how a computerized monitoring system impacts
own-race preference among umpires in Major League Baseball. Without monitoring, umpires
exhibit a similar in-group preference found here, and the probability of there being a strike
increases by 0.5900 percentage points when the umpire's and pitcher's ethnicities match.
This estimate is also signicant with 99 percent condence. When there is monitoring,
however, the change in strike probability is -0.4800 percentage points when the umpire's and
pitcher's ethnicities match, and this estimate is not statistically dierent from zero. This
result as striking as it is consistent with the results here.

6 These results are estimated using a linear probability model, although estimates from a logistic regression
suggest the same conclusion. Results from this procedures are in the appendix Table A2.2.
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Table 2.8: The Eect Of Opposite Race Referees On Call Probability, 2014/2015-2018/2019
(1)

(2)

(3)

Dep var: indicator equaling 1 if a foul is called
mean=0.238; sd=0.426
(Blk plr)×(% wht ref)

0.0028
(0.0205)

0.0049
(0.0230)

0.0051
(0.0217)

Controls
Player stats
Player characteristics
Opponent characteristics
Game characteristics
Player FE
Ref FE
Season FE
(Stats)×(% wht ref)

N

























29,647

29,647

29,647

Notes: Observations are at the player-event level. Standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered at the game level. Each

column reports the results of a separate linear probability model. All specications include controls for season average player
statistics, including fouls, points, defensive rebounds, oensive rebounds, assists, blocks, fouls, steals, turnovers, free-throw
attempts and makes, two-point attempts and makes, three-point attempts and makes, free-throw shooting percentage, twopoint shooting percentage, three-point shooting percentage, and minutes played (per 48 minutes played, as applicable); and
controls for player characteristics, including all-star status, starting status, height, weight, position, experience, and age. They
also include team and game controls, including home game status, win status, points scored by each team, team and opponent
playo status, coach and opponent coach race, and attendance.

Finally, all specications include referee and season xed

eects. Column (2) adds player xed eects to absorb any unaccounted for, time-invariant player characteristics. Column (3)
also interacts player statistics with %white referees, noting that player performance more broadly may change in the presence
of more white referees.
*** Signicant at a 1 percent level
** Signicant at a 5 percent level.
* Signicant at a 10 percent level.

Still, the starkly dierent result raises the question: is there something unique about
these games that can explain the divergent ndings? To answer this question, equation (1)
is re-estimated with a restricted sample that only includes games that appear in the LTMR.
Results are in appendix Table

A2.4, Panel A. Interestingly, the eect is uniformly signicant
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Table 2.4. This indicates

that there is nothing particular about these games that would explain the null result in

Table 2.8. On the contrary, it suggests that the pressure of close games makes biases more
likely to present themselves. Indeed, when the sample is extended to all games between
2014/2015 and 2018/2019 and the variable of interest is interacted with point spread, as in
done in appendix

Table A2.4, Panel B, there is clear evidence that bias is most pronounced

in close games. These results corroborate Parsons, Sulaeman, Yates, and Hamermesh (2011)
and Pope, Price, and Wolfers (2018), and suggest monitoring all but eliminates own-race
preference.
While there is no evidence of racial preference for calls during the last two minutes, it's
possible that bias manifests itself in other ways. As such, three supplementary models are
considered that again follow equation (1) but use the LTMR data and consider dierent
outcome variables. These variables are incorrectcallipgrt , an indicator equaling 1 if an incorrect call is made and 0 if a correct call is made; incorrectnocallipgrt , an indicator equaling
1 if a referee incorrectly fails to make a call and 0 if they correctly fail to make a call; and

incorrectdecisionipgrt , an indicator equaling 1 if a referee makes an incorrect decision and 0
otherwise. Results are in

Table 2.9. As with call propensity, there is no evidence for bias

in incorrect calls, incorrect no-calls, or incorrect decisions broadly speaking. This is further
evidence that the LTMRs act as a monitoring tool that discourages racial preference.7

7 These results are estimated using a linear probability model, although estimates from a logistic suggest
the same conclusion. Results from this estimating procedures are in the appendix Table A2.3.
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Table 2.9: The Eect Of Opposite Race Referees On Call Accuracy, 2014/2015-2018/2019
(1)

(2)

(3)

Dep var: indicator for incorrect call
(Blk plr)×(% wht ref)

N

0.009
(0.021)

0.010
(0.022)

0.003
(0.023)

7,198

7,198

7,198

Dep var: indicator for incorrect no-call
(Blk plr)×(% wht ref)

-0.012
(0.017)

-0.014
(0.017)

-0.012
(0.018)

N

22,449

22,449

22,449

Dep var: indicator for incorrect decision
(Blk plr)×(% wht ref)

-0.011
(0.014)

-0.011
(0.015)

-0.011
(0.015)

N

29,647

29,647

29,647

Controls
Player stats
Player characteristics
Opponent characteristics
Game characteristics
Player FE
Ref FE
Season FE
(Stats)×(% wht ref)

























Notes: Each panel is identical outside of the dependent variable. Observations are at the player-event level. Standard errors are

in parenthesis and are clustered at the game level. Within panel, each column reports the results of a separate regression. All
specications include controls for season average player statistics, player characteristics, team and game characteristics, coach
and opponent coach race, attendance, and referee and season xed eects. Column (2) adds player xed eects to absorb any
unaccounted for, time-invariant player characteristics. Column (3) also interacts player statistics with %white referees, noting
that player performance more broadly may change in the presence of more white referees.
*** Signicant at a 1 percent level
** Signicant at a 5 percent level.
* Signicant at a 10 percent level.
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Thus far, the examples of monitoring have been explicit: the publication and widespread
media coverage of Price and Wolfers (2010) and the distribution of LTMRs. It's also possible
that more subtle, implicit monitoring impacts bias, as well. Following Parsons, Sulaeman,
Yates, and Hamermesh (2011), this is tested by restricting the sample to well-attended
games, here dened as games with attendance totals above the median. The rationale here
is that there are more eyes watching the games, and the extra scrutiny increases the cost
of expressing bias. Results replicate

Tables 2.6 and can be found in appendix Table A2.5.

While coecients remain positive, the estimates are smaller and uniformly not signicant.
This suggests that even implicit monitoring can reduce own-race preference.

2.6

Conclusion

This paper estimates impact of racial bias among referees in the NBA. It does this by
exploiting two unique data sets. The rst of these is the NBA's play-by-play data, which
recently began reporting the specic referee making each foul call. The second of these is an
NBA's LTMRs, which describe the correctness of all calls and material non-calls during the
last two minutes of close games. Using these, the evidence suggests there is an own race bias
for both black and white referees, though it continues to be less prevalent than it was before
the widespread media attention Price and Wolfers (2010) garnered. All told, the evidence
suggests black and white referees call approximately 3 percent more fouls against players who
do not share their race. This own-race preference is especially pronounced in close games,
where the out-group penalty could be up to three times larger. Finally, the LTMR appear to
be eective monitors against bias, as there is no evidence of any own-race preference during
the last two minutes of close games. This result is particularly striking since close games are
when referee bias is generally most pronounced. There is also some evidence that implicit
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monitoring deters bias, as there is much less evidence of in-group preference in well-attended
games.
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Appendix

Figure A2.1: The Eect Of Opposite Race Referees On Foul Rate Over Time, 1991/19922018/2019

Notes: Point estimates over time using the specication from column (2) in Table 2.1 .
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Figure A2.2: The Eect Of Opposite Race Referees On Foul Rate Over Time, 1991/19922018/2019

Notes: Point estimates over time using the specication from column (3) in Table 2.1 .
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Table A2.1: Summary Statistics (ii)
Black players
(1)

sd
(2)

White players
(3)

sd
(4)

Dierence
(5)

p-value
(6)

Panel A: game and season statistics
Playos
Black coach
Attendance
Win

0.4950
0.2744
17.9138
0.4985

0.4990
0.4463
2.0384
0.5000

0.4600
0.2482
18.1036
0.5000

0.4980
0.4322
2.1061
0.5000

0.0350
0.0262
-0.1898
-0.0015

0.0004
0.1058
0.3340
0.6658

-0.0047
-0.0043
0.0020
-0.0072

0.1644
0.1977
0.5492
0.2272

Panel B: referee statistics
Referee 1 white
Referee 2 white
Referee 3 white
Total white refs

0.4814
0.4026
0.4735
1.3565

0.4997
0.4904
0.4993
0.8572

0.4862
0.4069
0.4715
1.3637

0.4998
0.4913
0.4992
0.8620

Panel C: sample statistics
Player
Games
Player-games
Player-minutes

736.0000
6560.0000
126809.0000
2577039.2002

184.0000
6510.0000
34644.0000
590288.2001

Total

920.0000
13070.0000
161453.0000
3167327.4003

Notes: Reported here are summary statistics for black and white players, the dierences between them, and a p-value for a

dierence in means test. Standard deviations are listed next to each group mean.
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Table A2.2: Eect Of Opposite Race Referees On Call Probability, 2014/2015-2018/2019
(1)

(2)

(3)

Dep var: indicator equaling 1 if a foul is called
mean=0.238; sd=0.426
(Blk plr)×(% wht ref)

0.0020
(0.0220)

0.0029
(0.0225)

0.0006
(0.0232)

Controls
Player stats
Player characteristics
Opponent characteristics
Game characteristics
Player FE
Ref FE
Season FE
(Stats)×(% wht ref)

N
Notes:

Observations are at the player-event level.

























29,647

29,647

29,647

Standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered at the game level.

Each column reports the results of a separate logistic regression.

Marginal eects are reported.

All specications include

controls for season average player statistics, including fouls, points, defensive rebounds, oensive rebounds, assists, blocks,
fouls, steals, turnovers, free-throw attempts and makes, two-point attempts and makes, three-point attempts and makes, freethrow shooting percentage, two-point shooting percentage, three-point shooting percentage, and minutes played (per 48 minutes
played, as applicable); and controls for player characteristics, including all-star status, starting status, height, weight, position,
experience, and age. They also include team and game controls, including home game status, win status, points scored by each
team, team and opponent playo status, coach and opponent coach race, and attendance. Finally, all specications include
referee and season xed eects.

Column (2) adds player xed eects to absorb any unaccounted for, time-invariant player

characteristics. Column (3) also interacts player statistics with %white referees, noting that player performance more broadly
may change in the presence of more white referees.
*** Signicant at a 1 percent level
** Signicant at a 5 percent level.
* Signicant at a 10 percent level.
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Table A2.3: The Eect Of Opposite Race Referees on Call Accuracy, 2014/2015-2018/2019
(1)

(2)

(3)

Dep var: indicator for incorrect call
(Blk plr)×(% wht ref)

N

0.0000
(0.0210)

-0.0060
(0.0386)

0.0006
(0.0232)

7,198

7,198

7,198

Dep var: indicator for incorrect no-call
(Blk plr)×(% wht ref)

N

-0.0073
(0.0177)

-0.0110
(0.0187)

-0.0074
(0.0194)

22,449

22,449

22,449

Dep var: indicator for incorrect decision
(Blk plr)×(% wht ref)

N

-0.0078
(0.0145)

-0.0110
(0.015)

-0.0110
(0.015)

29,647

29,647

29,647

Controls
Player stats
Player characteristics
Opponent characteristics
Game characteristics
Player FE
Ref FE
Season FE
(Stats)×(% wht ref)

























Notes: Each panel is identical outside of the dependent variable. Observations are at the player-event level. Standard errors are

in parenthesis and are clustered at the game level. Within panel, each column reports the results of a separate logistic regression.
Marginal eects are reported. All specications include controls for season average player statistics, player characteristics, team
and game characteristics, coach and opponent coach race, attendance, and referee and season xed eects. Column (2) adds
player xed eects to absorb any unaccounted for, time-invariant player characteristics.

Column (3) also interacts player

statistics with %white referees, noting that player performance more broadly may change in the presence of more white referees.
*** Signicant at a 1 percent level
** Signicant at a 5 percent level.
* Signicant at a 10 percent level.
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Table A2.4: The Eect of Opposite Race Referees On Foul Rate In Close Games, 2014/20152018/2019
(1)

(2)

(3)

Panel A: Dep var=(total fouls)Ö(48)/(minutes)
mean=4.1132; sd=3.1381
(Blk plr)×(% wht ref)

N

0.2666**
(0.120)

0.2694**
(0.1211)

0.2395*
(0.1292)

36,319

36,319

36,319

Panel B: Dep var=(total fouls)Ö(48)/(minutes)
mean=4.031; sd=3.193
(Blk plr)×(% wht ref)×(spread)
(Blk plr)×(% wht ref)

N

-0.0202***
(0.0023)
0.3317***
(0.0721)

-0.0204***
(0.0023)
0.3330***
(0.0725)

-0.0204***
(0.0023)
0.2966***
(0.0762)

128,047

128,047

128,047

Controls
Player stats
Player characteristics
Opponent characteristics
Game characteristics
Player FE
Ref FE
Season FE
(Stats)×(% wht ref)

























Notes: Observations are at the playergame level and are weighted by minutes played. For both panels, standard errors are

in parenthesis and are clustered at the game level. Within panel, each column reports the results of a separate regression. All
specications include controls for season average player statistics, including fouls, points, defensive rebounds, oensive rebounds,
assists, blocks, fouls, steals, turnovers, free-throw attempts and makes, two-point attempts and makes, three-point attempts
and makes, free-throw shooting percentage, two-point shooting percentage, three-point shooting percentage, and minutes played
(per 48 minutes played, as applicable); and controls for player characteristics, including all-star status, starting status, height,
weight, position, experience, and age.

They also include team and game controls, including home game status, win status,

points scored by each team, team and opponent playo status, coach and opponent coach race, and attendance. Finally, all
specications include referee and season xed eects. Column (2) adds player xed eects to absorb any unaccounted for, timeinvariant player characteristics. Column (3) also interacts player statistics with %white referees, noting that player performance
more broadly may change in the presence of more white referees.
*** Signicant at a 1 percent level
** Signicant at a 5 percent level.
* Signicant at a 10 percent level.
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Table A2.5: The Eect Of Race On Fouls From Opposite Race Referees In Well-Attended
Games, 2018/2019
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Dependent variable
(white fouls)×(48)/(min)
mean=2.4875; sd=2.5810
Black player
White player

0.0686 0.0576 0.0511
(0.0605) (0.0649) (0.0650)

(5)

(6)

Dependent variable
(black fouls)×(48)/(min)
mean=2.1963; sd=2.5734

0.0646 0.0469 0.0373
(0.0626) (0.0652) (0.0640)

Controls
Player stats
Player characteristics
Team characteristics
Opponent characteristics
Game characteristics
Player FE
Ref FE
Season FE
(Stats)×(% wht ref)
(Stats)×(% blk ref)

N


























8,742

8,742





























8,742

8,742


8,742

8,742

Notes: Observations are at the playergame level and are weighted by minutes played. Standard errors are in parenthesis and

are clustered at the game level. Each column reports the results of a separate regression. All specications include controls for
season average player statistics, including fouls, points, defensive rebounds, oensive rebounds, assists, blocks steals, turnovers,
free-throw attempts and makes, two-point attempts and makes, three-point attempts and makes, free-throw shooting percentage,
two-point shooting percentage, three-point shooting percentage, and minutes played (per 48 minutes played, as applicable).
They also include team and game controls, including home game status, win status, points scored by each team, team and
opponent playo status, coach and opponent coach race, and attendance. Finally, all specications include referee xed eects.
No specication includes player xed eects, as they would absorb the variable of interest. Season xed eects are also omitted,
as the sample is restricted to one season. Columns (2) and (5) add controls for player characteristics, including all-star status,
starting status, height, weight, position, experience, and age. Column (3) interacts player statistics with % white referees while
Column (6) interacts player statistics with % black referees, noting that player performance more broadly may change in the
presence of more opposite race referees.
*** Signicant at a 1 percent level
** Signicant at a 5 percent level.
* Signicant at a 10 percent level.

Chapter 3
The Eect Of Minimum Wages On Time
Allocation: Estimates Using Contiguous
Counties
3.1

Introduction

In 1938, the United States introduced minimum wages for the rst time as a way to combat
poverty and ensure workers earned a livable wage. Since then, there has been considerable
debate about its ecacy. Early on, those like Stigler (1946) argued that competitive forces
would drive down employment, while others like Lester (1947) contended that the labor market is fundamentally dierent than commodity markets, so normal market outcomes can't be
expected. Whatever the truth is, the scope of the discussion has remained mostly consistent
over time, and few outcomes other than employment and wages are ever considered. The
goal of this paper is to broaden this discussion. Rather than focusing on outcomes, the focus
will be on how minimum wages change decision making. In particular, it will look at young
people's decision to enroll in school, enter the labor market, or be idle.
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Since minimum wages are most likely to be binding for teens, the minimum wage literature
as it relates to young people is extensive. For example, Neumark and Wascher (1992) use a
two-way xed eects model with state-level panel data to show that minimum wages decrease
employment among teens. Others that nd similar results include Zavodny (2000), Keil,
Robertson, and Symons (2001), and Sabia (2006), all using variations of the two-way xed
eects model. There are even examples where school enrollment is included in the discussion
as a control variable. For example, Neumark and Wascher (1992) estimates employment
eects controlling for school enrollment for teens and young adults.1 Neumark and Wascher
(1994) does the same using an instrumental variable for enrollment.2 Burkhauser, Couch,
and Wittenburg (2000) look at high-school graduates and dropouts individually, nding
considerably larger dis-employment eects for dropouts.
Research related specically to time allocation is more limited. Since 1980, there are
only a handful of papers that explicitly consider teenage labor force participation.3 Of
the few, Wessels (2001, 2005) uses state-level xed eects with autoregressive labor force
participation rates to control for labor market trends. In doing so, the author nds evidence
that minimum wages decrease labor force participation.4 Meanwhile, Ahn, Arcidiancono,
Wessels (2011) use monthly, individual-level CPS data and a one-shot search model with
endogenous rm entry to show that minimum wages increase employment probabilities for
teens from educated families, while pushing teens from lower educated families out of the
labor market.
Research on school enrollment is more extensive, but still limited. Cunningham (1981)
uses cross-sectional evidence from the 1960 and 1970 censuses along with a robust set of
1 Card, Katz, Krueger (1994) point out that the school enrollment variable only includes individuals who
are enrolled in school and not employed, which they argue would negatively bias in the estimated employment
eects.

2 Card, Katz, Krueger (1994) argues that school enrollment doesn't belong in the employment equation

at all because that equation is essentially a labor demand function.

3 Not to minimize the impact of Kaitz (1970), Mincer (1976), Ragan (1977), and Wessels (1980).
4 Similar results can be found in Kaitz (1970), Mincer (1976), Ragan (1977), and Wessels (1980).

CHAPTER 3.

THE EFFECT OF MINIMUM WAGES ON TIME ALLOCATION

65

controls to show that minimum wages decrease school enrollment. Neumark and Wascher
(1995a) uses individual-level panel data and a multinomial logit model to estimate various
transitions between school and work; while Neumark and Wascher (1995b) use state-year
level data and a conditional logit model to do the same. In both cases, the evidence suggests minimum wages cause school enrollment to fall. Neumark and Wascher (2005) update
Neumark and Wascher (1995a) with data extending to 1998, nding similar but more modest results. Using state-level data on public school enrollment and a two-way xed eects
model, Chaplin, Turner, and Pape (2001) also nd a decrease in school enrollment. Turner
and Demiralp (2001) use an approach similar to Neumark and Wascher (1995a) but focus on
the early 1990s increase in the federal minimum wage. Their results suggested that overall,
the higher minimum wage induced some teenagers to leave school for employment.
Not all research suggests enrollment falls, however. Examples to the contrary include
Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson (2005) and Ehrenberg and Marcus (1982), both of which
use an approach similar to Neumark and Wascher (1995a). Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson
(2005) use this to examine province-level panel data from Canada from 1993 to 1999, and
nd a marginally positive net eect on enrollment, though it is not signicant. Ehrenberg
and Marcus (1982) use individual-level panel data from the US and nd that increasing the
minimum wage causes youth from low income families to shift from being both enrolled and
employed to simply enrolled in school full-time. In the macroeconomic literature, Cahuc
and Michel (1996) create a model illustrating that minimum wages decrease the quantity
demanded for unskilled labor, which provides an incentive for workers to accumulate human
capital. Similarly, Cubitt and Heap (2003) use a two-period, general equilibrium model to
show that there is a range of minimum wages that will induce human capital investment.
Each of these previous studies represent important additions to the literature. They are
also largely identied using national, panel data. These xed-eect approaches control for
period and location, but they treat all potential counterfactuals as equal. Local economic
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trends are largely ignored, which can lead to spurious results if there is regional labor market
heterogeneity (Allegretto, Dube, and Reich, 2011). This can be seen clearly in Foote (2007)
and Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010), which reverse or nullify the disemployment estimates
from previous research after accounting for spatial heterogeneity.
Economists have been aware of this issue for years, but there is still no consensus on
the best way to address it. The most straight forward and common technique in modern
literature is to update the canonical two-way xed eects model to include location by year
dummies along with state linear trends. There are innumerable examples of this in the
literature (Autor, 2003; Neumark and Wascher, 2007; Addison, Blackburn, and Cotti, 2009;
Sabia, 2009; Sabia and Burkhauser, 2010).5 Others argue that these do not adequately
address the problem, since the these trends may themselves be aected by minimum wages
(Dube, Lester and Reich, 2010, 2013; Allegretto, Dube, and Reich, 2011; Magruder, 2013).
There have been a number of more complex solutions developed through the years, including the use of synthetic controls (Sabia, Burkhauser, and Hansen, 2012; Neumark, Salas,
and Wascher, 2013; Powell, 2016), the use of dynamic panels (Neumark and Wascher, 2004;
Meer and West, 2013), the use of local case studies (Card and Krueger, 1994, 1997, 2000;
Dube, Naidu, and Reich, 2007), and the use of border discontinuities.6 This paper adopts
the last of these solutions, controlling for labor market heterogeneity by limiting the sample
to counties that lie directly on either side of a state border. This strategy allows for the
inclusion of county-pair specic time dummies, which limit the set of counterfactuals to observations in counties that share market conditions and trends but are subject to dierent
minimum wage laws. This approach rst appeared in Holmes (1998), which use it to estimate the eects of right-to-work legislation. The strategy was rst applied to the minimum
5 Neumark, Salas, Wascher (2014) argue that higher order trends are preferable for data sets spanning
longer time frames.

6 There are benets and drawbacks to each of these, the specics of which are outside the scope of this

analysis. See Allegretto, Dube, Reich, and Zipperer (2017) for a thorough examination.
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wage literature in Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010), which use it to estimate the impact of
minimum wages on employment and wages. It has also been used in the context of education
in Black (2009), which estimates how much parents value schooling by comparing housing
prices directly around school district boundaries.
This paper adds to the literature by being the rst to consider the eect of minimum
wages on school enrollment, labor force participation, and idleness using the boundary discontinuity identication strategy, and one of the only that attempts to account for spatial
heterogeneity at all. Using data from the monthly release of the Current Population Survey
(CPS) from 1995 to 2016, the evidence suggests that a 10 percent increase in the minimum
wage is associated with up to a 1.006 percentage point increase in the probability of school
enrollment. Furthermore, the increases in enrollment appear to be driven by changes in fulltime enrollment and enrollment while not employed. These results are robust to alternative
specications that use more traditional estimation procedures. The evidence for labor force
participation and idleness is mixed and inconclusive.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:

(2) Theoretical Founation provides

a theoretical foundation for the analysis with a simple two-period model;

(3) Empirical

Strategy outlines an empirical strategy that describes how the result is identied and why
it is an improvement over the alternatives;
construction;

3.2

(4) Data describes data sources and data-set

(5) Results characterizes the results; (6) Conclusion gives concluding remarks.

Theoretical Foundation

To give context for the results, this paper considers a simple two-period model derived from
Mincer (1976).7 Here, agents choose education versus labor force participation in the rst
period and receive an income in the second period. Individuals choose consumption both
7 With help from lecture notes provided by Daron Acemaglu.

CHAPTER 3.

THE EFFECT OF MINIMUM WAGES ON TIME ALLOCATION

68

periods, education in the rst period, and are endowed with an exogenous starting income
in period one. Second period income is a function of rst period education.
In such a world, agents choose to maximize:

u(c1i , c2i ) = lnc1i +

1
lnc2
1+r i

(3.1)

Subject to their budget:

c1i +

c2i
E[ws ] − E[wu ]
E[wu ]
≤ yi +
+ ei
− ei θi
1+r
1+r
1+r

(3.2)

where c1i is consumption in the rst period, c2i is consumption in the second period, ei is
a dummy variable equaling 1 if person

i attends school and 0 otherwise, wu is the wage for

unskilled labor, ws is the wage for skilled labor, yi is an endowment in the rst period, and

θi is the psychic and explicit cost of education. Note that E[wu ] does not necessarily equal
the minimum wage, since individuals are not guaranteed employment if they enter the labor
market.
Maximizing with respect to education yields θi ≤

E[ws ]−E[wu ]
.
1+r

This means that agents

will choose education if the cost of attending school is less than the expected, discounted
wage premium for skilled workers in period 2. This maximization problem does not make
a conclusive prediction, and leaves room for two potential outcomes. If the dis-employment
eect for teens is small, then the expected wage increases with the minimum wage, which
in turn increases the opportunity cost of attending school. This would be likely to occur if
the minimum wage does not induce older workers to enter the market and/or the minimum
wage is suciently low that it does not appreciably change the quantity of labor demanded.
In this situation, overall enrollment should decrease while labor force participation should
rise.
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Alternatively, if the dis-employment eect for teens is large, then the expected wage
decreases when the minimum wage rises, which in turn decreases the opportunity cost of
attending school. This would be likely to occur if the new wage brings older works into the
labor force and/or the minimum wage is suciently high that it appreciably changes the
quantity of labor demanded. In this case, getting a degree would also increase the likelihood
of nding employment in the long-run, thereby increasing the value of staying in school
today. In this situation, overall enrollment should rise while labor force participation should
decrease.

3.3

Empirical Strategy

The two way xed eects model, which exploits cross-state variation in minimum wages
with common time eects, is historically the most common identication strategy used
in minimum literature. The identifying assumption in these models is that all locations
are equally valid counterfactuals for treatment states. Unfortunately, economic conditions
change through time and space, and if any of these changes are unobserved then the results
might be biased (Dube, Lester and Reich, 2010; Allegretto, Dube, and Reich, 2011; Magruder, 2013; Allegretto, Dube, Reich, and Zipperer, 2017). One common solution to this
is to add area-specic time eects, but these only remove time-invariant heterogeneity, not
trends. For this reason, these are usually paired with linear state trends, as in Neumark and
Wascher (2007), but this can create further problems if the trends themselves are aected
by minimum wages (Dube, Lester and Reich, 2010; Allegretto, Dube, Reich, and Zipperer,
2017).
As such, the preferred identication strategy in this paper exploits variation between
counties that lie across a shared state boundary, a strategy developed by Holmes (1998) and
rst used in the minimum wage literature by Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010). The benet
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of constructing the data in this way is that counterfactuals are chosen from a pool of donors
that share the same economic conditions and trends; yet, because they are in a dierent
state, are subject to dierent minimum wage laws.
The identifying assumption for this strategy is E[ln(ωtc ), εitcp ] = 0. This means that
within-pair dierences in minimum wage laws are uncorrelated with the residual. Identication also requires the ability for counties to appear in the data set multiple times. This is
needed because each county potentially abuts more than one county across a state border.
As such, each observation is in the data the number of times its county is part of a countypair. This has implications for the standard errors, as it's possible that observations aren't
independent across a border segment. The same is true for counties within a state, since
minimum wage laws vary at the state level. Therefore, standard errors are clustered at the
state and state border level.
The estimating equation is:

yitcp = β0 + β1 ln(ωts ) + β3 Xitcp + β4 Fitcp + β4 Ctc + φc + τpt + εitcp

(3.3)

where yitcp is vector of discrete outcome variables related to school enrollment, labor
force participation, and their intersection for individual
8

. ln(ωts ) is the minimum wage in time

level covariates for county

i in time t in county c and pair p ;

t in state s;Ctc is a vector of time-varying county-

c in time t ; Xitcp is a vector of individual-level covariates for

individual i in time t in county c and pair p ; Fitcp is a vector of controls individual i 's family
inter-relationships for individual

i in time t in county c and pair p ; φc is a vector of county

xed-eects; and τtp is a matrix of pair-specic time eects.
The identication strategy used in this paper follows in a thread of the literature that
focuses on local variation that has become widely used since Card and Krueger (1994), which
8 The specic variables used are dened more precisely in the results section.
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compares economic outcomes in Pennsylvania and New Jersey after a unilateral minimum
wage change in New Jersey. While these strategies have become common, they are not
without criticism. The crux of these criticisms is best summarized by Neumark, Salas, and
Wascher (2014):
The overriding concern we have with these studies is that their research designs,
because of researcher concerns about avoiding minimum wage variation that is
potentially confounded with other sources of employment change, discard a great
deal of valid identifying informationthrowing out the identifying baby along
with, or worse yet instead of, the contaminated bathwater. (Neumark, Salas,
and Wascher, 2014: 611)
In light of this, the preceding analysis is reproduced using a two-way xed eects model and
the unrestricted data set. These specications will include region by period dummies and,
iteratively, linear, quadratic, and cubic state trends. Since observations in a given county
are potentially not independent from other observations in the same state, it is possible
that there is some correlation in the residuals within state. Therefore, standard errors are
clustered at the state level.
The estimating equation is:

yitcp = β0 + β1 ln(ωtc ) + β3 Xitcp + φc + τrt + ξs Is × t + εitcp

(3.4)

where τrt is a region specic time eect, Is is a dummy variable for each state, ξs is a
state specic time trend, and all other variables are as previously dened.
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Data Sources And Construction Of Sample

3.4.1 Data Sources
The data comes from the monthly release of the CPS from 1995 to 2016. Data from the
CPS is individual level and is restricted to people between 16 and 19 years old for the bulk
of the analysis.9 This is done for three reasons. First, minimum wages are more likely to be
binding for this population. Second, these are traditional ages for students to be enrolled
in high school. Third, these ages are consistent with the bulk of minimum wage literature.
For information on state and federal minimum wage changes, this paper uses data from the
Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor.

3.4.2 Sample
There are 3,108 counties in mainland United States. 1,139 of these counties lie along a state
border. The CPS interviews individuals from 411 of those 3,108 total counties across 46
contiguous states (and the District of Columbia). These can be seen visually in

Figure 3.1.

Of the 411 counties in the unrestricted sample, 90 counties in 31 states (and the District of
Columbia) lie along state border. These can be seen visually in

9 For robustness checks it is extended to include 20-34 year olds.

Figure 3.2.

CHAPTER 3.

THE EFFECT OF MINIMUM WAGES ON TIME ALLOCATION

73

Figure 3.1: Counties In Current Population Survey, All Sample

Notes: this map illustrates the counties surveyed in the unrestricted CPS monthly sample. In total, it includes 411 of the 3,108

counties across 46 of the 49 mainland states (including the District of Columbia).

Figure 3.2: Counties In Current Population Survey, Contiguous Sample

Notes: this map illustrates the counties surveyed in the restricted CPS monthly sample. In total, it includes 90 of the 3,108

counties across 31 of the 49 mainland states (including the District of Columbia).
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3.4.3 Contiguous Counties
After proper weighting, the monthly CPS is a nationally representative sample. One concern
with restricting it to counties that lie along state borders is that it threatens external validity.
If there is something about these counties that makes them dierent than a nationally
representative sample then the results would be less useful (though still internally valid).

Table 3.1 displays summary statistics for the unrestricted and restricted samples. There are
some notable dierences. The average total population, for instance, is 8.900 percent lower
in contiguous counties. Poverty level is 9.413 percent higher. This is further motivation for
replicating the results with a two-way xed eects model with the unrestricted sample. Still,
on the whole the two samples are quite similar in the dimensions that most directly inuence
this analysis: average minimum wage, school enrollment rate, and labor force participation
rate (for both adults and youth).
One feature that stands out from the descriptive statistics in

Table 3.1 is that there are

considerably fewer counties in the restricted sample. This introduces the concern that there
is not enough identifying variation. One feature of this identication strategy is that it stacks
each border county-pair, so that counties appear in the sample as many times as it is paired
with a neighbor across the border. This is why there are 140 county pairs instead of just 45.
The net eect of this is more variation in minimum wage treatment than might be expected.
This can be seen visually in

Figure 3.3, which shows the number of county pairs with wage

dierentials and the average dierence in those pairs.

CHAPTER 3.

THE EFFECT OF MINIMUM WAGES ON TIME ALLOCATION

75

Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
All sample

sd

(1)

(2)

Contig
sample
(3)

sd
(4)

Panel A: demographic statistics
Total population
Men per 100 women
Median age
Percent white
Percent black
Percent Asian
Percent Hispanic

518,559.6493
96.5350
38.3917
76.2927
11.6086
4.7094
13.1584

432,775.2370
3.5888
3.2080
15.0201
11.7349
5.5900
14.1159

472,409.8827
96.6800
37.6320
77.2225
11.5202
3.8916
13.4140

689,468.7785
4.0819
4.2051
14.9609
11.9829
4.9108
15.1901

Panel B: economic statistics
Minimum wage
Poverty rate
Total employed
Unemployment rate
Total labor force
Labor force part rate

7.2401
21.2448
242,068.4638
7.7753
273,042.6825
67.2907

1.0654
6.6628
196,766.7892
3.0222
223,524.6141
5.1403

7.3362
19.6844
216,362.4165
7.7834
244,206.1565
66.1863

1.1058
5.1119
313,184.3565
2.9361
352,976.7106
5.4102

Panel C: demographic and economic statistics, teen specic
Total population
Total enrolled
Enrollment rate
Total labor force
Labor force part rate
Number of counties
Number of county pairs
Number of states

35,002.3728
30,731.7186
86.1720
10,921.6612
42.3271
411.0000
46.0000

29,970.4814
25,950.7991
4.9993
8,307.7395
9.5295

32,340.8484
28,229.0923
85.9559
10,066.6581
42.4751

47,905.3169
41,985.8469
5.3254
12,414.8612
9.6546

90.0000
140.0000
31.0000

Notes: Sample means are reported for all counties in the Unite States included in the monthly release of the CPS and for the

subset of counties that lie on a state border. Standard deviations are listed in the adjoining columns. Minimum wages are in
nominal dollars. Poverty rate is determined by state-specic classication. Note that total teen population is for ages 15-19,
not 16-19.
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Figure 3.3: Variation In Minimum Wages Between County Pairs

Notes:

this gure displays the number of counties that are part of a contiguous county-pair that exhibits a minimum wage

dierential and the average size of the gap between 1995 and 2016.
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Results

Table 3.2 presents primary results for school enrollment. The dependent variable in Panel
A is dichotomous, equaling 1 if an individual is in school and 0 otherwise. The dependent
variable in

Panel B equals 1 if an individual is in school full-time and 0 if they are not in

school. The dependent variable in

Panel C is equals 1 if an individual is in school part-time

and 0 if they are not in school.
Each column in

Table 3.2 represents a separate regression. All specications include

individual level controls, including age, gender, race, ethnicity, marital status, years of education, and a dummy variable for completing high school. They also all include county
xed eects and county-pair specic time eects. Columns (2) and (4) include time-varying
county controls, including the natural log of population and the employment rate. Columns
(3) and (4) include controls for family dynamics, including an individual's relation to household head, the number of adults living in the household, and the number of children living
in the household.
In all specications, evidence suggests that minimum wages increase enrollment. Precisely, it suggests that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage is associated with up to
a 1.006 percentage point increase in the probability of school enrollment; a 1.086 percentage
point increase in the probability of full-time enrollment; and weak evidence for up to a 0.671
percentage point decrease in the probability of part-time enrollment.
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Table 3.2: The Eect Of Minimum Wages On School Enrollment (i), Contiguous Sample
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Panel A: all enrollment
lnMW

0.0950*
(0.0519)

0.1006**
(0.0480)

0.0887*
(0.0452)

0.0928**
(0.0430)

N

165,163

165,163

165,163

165,163

Panel B: full-time enrollment
lnMW

0.1033*
(0.0522)

0.1086**
(0.0492)

0.0963**
(0.0449)

0.1003**
(0.0434)

N

160,165

160,165

160,165

160,165

Panel C: part-time enrollment
lnMW

N

-0.0654
(0.0818)

-0.0671
(0.0783)

-0.0616
(0.0810)

-0.0632
(0.0774)

48,129

48,129

48,129

48,129










Controls
Individual controls
Family controls
County controls
County FE
(County pair)×(period)
Notes:












Each column in represents a separate regression.




All specications include individual level controls, including age,

gender, race, ethnicity, marital status, years of education, and a dummy variable for completing high school.

They also all

include county xed eects and county-pair specic time eects. Columns (2) and (4) include time-varying county controls,
including the natural log of population and the employment rate. Columns (3) and (4) include controls for family dynamics,
including an individual's relation to household head, the number of adults living in the household, and the number of children
living in the household. All specications use data from the contiguous county CPS sample.
*** Signicant at a 1 percent level.
** Signicant at a 5 percent level.
* Signicant at a 10 percent level.
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Of course, teens do not make their education decision in isolation. They make it along
with their decision to enter the labor force. This interplay is tested in

Table 3.3, Panel A,

which shows the eect of minimum wages on school enrollment when not part of the labor
force. The dependent variable is dichotomous, equaling 1 if a person is in school and not
in the labor force and 0 if they are not in school. Similarly,

Panel B present the results for

school enrollment when an individual is not employed. The dependent variable here is also
dichotomous, equaling 1 if a person is in school and not employed and 0 if they are not in
school. Each column represent a dierent specication, the specics of which are identical
to

Table 3.2.
As before, the evidence suggests that minimum wages increase school enrollment, though

the magnitude of the coecients are smaller and not as consistently signicant. Precisely,
there is weak evidence that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage is associated with a
0.598 to 0.757 percentage point increase in the probability of school enrollment without being
part of the labor force; and a 0.751 to 0.925 percentage point increase in the probability of
enrollment without being employed.
The preceding results are striking and largely inconsistent with the prevailing literature.
This is not surprising, as previous attempts to estimate the impact of the minimum wage
on enrollment uniformly employ two-way xed eects models, which suer from a strong
negative bias by not accounting for spatial heterogeneity (Allegretto, Dube, and Reich; 2011).
There are many examples of this phenomenon in the literature. For example, Shimer (2001)
uses a national cross-section to argue that state-level youth shares and unemployment rates
are negatively correlated. In a response, Foote (2007) argues that these results are driven by
spatial correlation in the state-level data. Using a longer sample period and some controls
for spatial correlation, point estimates for the youth-share eect on unemployment become
positive. The same is true in Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010), where the authors estimate
the eect of minimum wages on teen employment using both a two-way xed eects model
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and a model exploiting variation within county pairs, as is done here. With the former they
nd evidence for large and highly signicant disemployment eects, but with the latter the
point estimates are marginally positive and not statistically dierent from zero. So, while
the results in Table

3.2 and Table 3.3 are appreciably dierent from previous estimates, this

is not an entirely unexpected result.
Table 3.3: The Eect Of Minimum Wages On School Enrollment (ii), Contiguous Sample
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Panel A: enrolled and not in the labor force
lnMW

0.0635
(0.0642)

0.0757
(0.0566)

0.0598
(0.0533)

0.0705
(0.0484)

N

127,070

127,070

127,070

127,070

Panel B: enrolled and not employed
lnMW

0.0813
(0.0579)

0.0925*
(0.0516)

0.0751
(0.0483)

0.0850*
(0.0447)

N

133,727

133,727

133,727

133,727










Controls
Individual controls
Family controls
County controls
County FE
(County pair)×(period)
Notes:












Each column in represents a separate regression.




All specications include individual level controls, including age,

gender, race, ethnicity, marital status, years of education, and a dummy variable for completing high school.

They also all

include county xed eects and county-pair specic time eects. Columns (2) and (4) include time-varying county controls,
including the natural log of population and the employment rate. Columns (3) and (4) include controls for family dynamics,
including an individual's relation to household head, the number of adults living in the household, and the number of children
living in the household. All specications use data from the contiguous county CPS sample.
*** Signicant at a 1 percent level.
** Signicant at a 5 percent level.
* Signicant at a 10 percent level.

CHAPTER 3.

THE EFFECT OF MINIMUM WAGES ON TIME ALLOCATION

81

The eect of minimum wages on labor force participation alone is also considered. For
teens, the results for this relationship are in Table

3.4, Panel A. Since employment outcomes

are zero sum, estimates for 20-24 year olds and 25-34 year olds are reported in

Panel B and

Panel C, respectively. The dependent variable in all three panels is dichotomous, equaling
1 if a person is in labor force and 0 if they are not. As before, each column represent a
dierent specication, the specics of which are identical to

Table 3.2. For teens, the age

group of interest, there is no compelling evidence that minimum wages impact labor force
participation. The coecient of interest is marginally positive, but it is highly insignicant.
Interestingly, when this same regressions are estimated with an older sample, there is a
some qualitative evidence that labor force participation rises.10 These results suggest that
higher wages could induce people in this age bracket to enter the labor force, increasing
competition for jobs and decreasing the expected wage for teens when they enter the labor
market. This is consistent with the theoretical model, and suggests that the expected wage
for young people falls when minimum wages rise. This helps explain why school enrollment
rises in

Tables 3.2 and Table 3.3.

10 The age range is chosen is consistent with the broader minimum wage literature.
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Table 3.4: The Eect Of Minimum Wages On Labor Force Participation, Contiguous Sample
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Panel A: in the labor force, ages 16-19
lnMW

0.0210
(0.0733)

0.0152
(0.0726)

0.0244
(0.0716)

0.0198
(0.0714)

N

165,163

165,163

165,163

165,163

Panel B: in the labor force, ages 20-24
lnMW

0.0560
(0.0703)

0.0647
(0.0759)

0.0554
(0.0756)

0.0652
(0.0810)

N

202,042

202,042

202,042

202,042

Panel C: in the labor force, ages 25-34
lnMW

0.0427
(0.0376)

0.0444
(0.0385)

0.0420
(0.0366)

0.0443
(0.0373)

N

460,204

460,204

460,204

460,204










Controls
Individual controls
Family controls
County controls
County FE
(County pair)×(period)
Notes:












Each column in represents a separate regression.




All specications include individual level controls, including age,

gender, race, ethnicity, marital status, years of education, and a dummy variable for completing high school.

They also all

include county xed eects and county-pair specic time eects. Columns (2) and (4) include time-varying county controls,
including the natural log of population and the employment rate. Columns (3) and (4) include controls for family dynamics,
including an individual's relation to household head, the number of adults living in the household, and the number of children
living in the household. All specications use data from the contiguous county CPS sample.
*** Signicant at a 1 percent level.
** Signicant at a 5 percent level.
* Signicant at a 10 percent level.
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The theoretically model assumes that agents are rational. They choose education or
labor market participation in a way that maximizes their lifetime earnings. This suggests
that incentive structure might change the type of activities teens engage in, but it doesn't
leave room for them to stop engaging in activities altogether. So, if there were evidence
that they became more idle in response to a minimum wage change, it would threaten the
underlying assumptions of this analysis. This possibility is considered in

Table 3.5. Here,

the dependent variable is dichotomous, equaling 1 if a person is not school and not in the
labor force and 0 if they are enrolled in school or in the labor force. As before, each column
represent a dierent specication, the specics of which are identical to

Table 3.2. There is

some qualitative evidence that idleness falls, but the coecients are very small and highly
insignicant.
For robustness, the main results in

Tables 3.2-3.5 are re-estimated using a two-way

xed eects model. These results are in

Table 3.6.

11

All specications include the same

individual controls, family controls, and time-varying county controls from earlier regressions.
To account for spatial heterogeneity, region by period time eects and state linear trends are
also included.
All told, the results tell a very similar story, especially with respect to school enrollment.
The results for the other dependent variables are larger and more signicant in most cases
and tell a story that aligns with the theoretical model. That is, higher minimum wages
induce older people to enter the labor force, which reduces the expected wage for teens. This
encourages them to leave the labor market and enroll in school. Interestingly, the signicance
on the coecients are uniformly more signicant than those using the county pair sample,
likely because of the larger sample size.

11 Estimates using this estimating procedure and the contiguous sample are also estimated. The results
are qualitatively similar and are in the appendix Table A3.1.
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Table 3.5: The Eect Of Minimum Wages On Idleness, Contiguous Sample
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Idleness
lnMW

-0.0027
(0.0341)

-0.0070
(0.0359)

-0.0007
(0.0338)

-0.0050
(0.0354)

N

165,163

165,163

165,163

165,163










Controls
Individual controls
Family controls
County controls
County FE
(County pair)×(period)
Notes:












Each column in represents a separate regression.




All specications include individual level controls, including age,

gender, race, ethnicity, marital status, years of education, and a dummy variable for completing high school.

They also all

include county xed eects and county-pair specic time eects. Columns (2) and (4) include time-varying county controls,
including the natural log of population and the employment rate. Columns (3) and (4) include controls for family dynamics,
including an individual's relation to household head, the number of adults living in the household, and the number of children
living in the household. All specications use data from the contiguous county CPS sample.
*** Signicant at a 1 percent level.
** Signicant at a 5 percent level.
* Signicant at a 10 percent level.
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Table 3.6: The Eect Of Minimum Wages With Linear Trends, All Sample

lnMW

N
lnMW

N
lnMW

N

(1)

(2)

(3)

In school, all

In school, full-time

In school, part-time

630,515

608,614

187,549

In school, no labor

In school, no emp
0.0788**
(0.0386)

-0.0262
(0.0177)

475,353

501,297

630,515

In labor, 16-19

In labor, 20-24

In labor, 25-34

630,515

746,576

1,622,541

0.0788**
(0.0348)

0.0851**
(0.0393)

0.0157
(0.0273)

0.0813**
(0.0330)

-0.00111
(0.0249)

0.0101
(0.0349)

Idle

0.0250
(0.0172)

Controls
Individual controls
Family controls
County controls
County FE
(Region)×(period)
State linear trends
State quadratic
trends
State cubic trends






















Notes: All specications include individual level controls, including age, gender, race, ethnicity, marital status, years of edu-

cation, and a dummy variable for completing high school; controls for family dynamics, including an individual's relation to
household head, the number of adults living in the household, and the number of children living in the household. They also all
include county xed eects, region-specic time eects, and linear state trends. All specications use data from the full CPS
monthly sample.
*** Signicant at a 1 percent level.
** Signicant at a 5 percent level.
* Signicant at a 10 percent level.
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One criticism of using state linear trends is that they are not exible enough to accommodate business cycles, and are therefore not suitable for data sets that span longer time
intervals (Neumark and Wascher, 2011; Neumark, Salas, and Wascher, 2014). This is especially true for data sets like the ones used in this paper that include particularly large
recessions and recoveries. Instead, Neumark, Salas, and Wascher (2014) recommend using
trends of third-order (or higher) to allow for multiple inection points.12 These results are
in

Table 3.7. Again, there is no substantive dierence in the results.

13

Another concern with the results in

Tables 3.2-3.5 is spillover, which has the potential

to occur whenever markets are linked. Since these models depend on comparisons between
counties that border one another, there is obviously spillover potential. One way to test this
is to further restrict the sample to only include individuals who remain in the same state
throughout the sample period.14 Doing this does not reduce the number of counties, border
pairs, states, or state borders. It also reduces the total sample by only 4.0057 percent. One
limitation of this procedure is that workers can cross a border for a job even if they do
not move. That said, the bulk of the results in this paper are driven by changes in school
enrollment, and enrolling in school in any given county requires a person to actually live in
that county.15 So, to change schools, a family would have to physically move to another state.
Results using the preferred specication are not appreciably dierent than when using the
unrestricted contiguous pair sample, which suggests that spillover is not driving the results.
These estimates are in the appendix

Table A3.4.

12 Allegretto, Dube, Reich, and Zipperer (2017) disagree with this conclusion, arguing: beyond [quadratic
trends], tting polynomials of higher orders primarily leaves in high frequency variation (such as business
cycle or seasonality) and noise based on parametric assumptions. As such, Table 3.6 is also replicated with
quadratic state trends. This can be found in the appendix Table A3.1.

13 Neumark and Wascher (2017) note that a particular advantage of individual level data is the ability to

add state-by-urban-by-year xed eects, which completely subsume any area-specic trends. Estimates using
this specication is in the appendix. They are again qualitatively similar, though much larger in magnitude.

14 This is only possible because of Drew, Flood, and Warren (2014), which created individual-level iden-

tiers and weights for the CPS and published them through PUMPS.

15 The exception is private school enrollment. However, public schools educate over 91 percent of American

children according to the National Center for Education Statistics.
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Table 3.7: The Eect Of Minimum Wages With Cubic Trends, All Sample

lnMW

N
lnMW

N
lnMW

N

(1)

(2)

(3)

In school, all

In school, full-time

In school, part-time

630,515

608,614

187,549

In school, no labor

In school, no emp
0.0747*
(0.0384)

-0.0246
(0.0180)

475,353

501,297

630,515

In labor, 16-19

In labor, 20-24

In labor, 25-34

630,515

746,576

1,622,541

0.0764**
(0.0348)

0.0810**
(0.0393)

0.0232
(0.0299)

0.0791**
(0.0329)

0.00456
(0.0238)

0.0077
(0.0341)

Idle

0.0298*
(0.0177)

Controls
Individual controls
Family controls
County controls
County FE
(Region)×(period)
State linear trends
State quadratic
trends
State cubic trends

























Notes: All specications include individual level controls, including age, gender, race, ethnicity, marital status, years of edu-

cation, and a dummy variable for completing high school; controls for family dynamics, including an individual's relation to
household head, the number of adults living in the household, and the number of children living in the household. They also
all include county xed eects, region-specic time eects, and cubic state trends. All specications use data from the full CPS
monthly sample.
*** Signicant at a 1 percent level.
** Signicant at a 5 percent level.
* Signicant at a 10 percent level.
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One nal concern is that county pairs did not adequately account for spatial heterogeneity.
This would mean some other phenomenon correlated with minimum wages drives the results.
Neumark, Salas, and Wascher (2014) argue that this is possible, since synthetic controls
estimates indicate that distance is not a strong predictor of which counties are chosen as
donors.16 This concern is addressed with a placebo test. Since there is no evidence of
spillover, each county is assigned a spatially correlated placebo minimum wage from its
county pair. Then, using equation 3.4, the impact of the placebo minimum wage is estimated
for each outcome variable. The results for this placebo test are in the appendix

Table A3.5.

Uniformly, the estimates are small and indistinguishable from zero. This indicates that the
main results are driven by the minimum wage changes themselves, not unobserved (and
unaccounted for) factors related to the minimum wage.

3.6

Conclusion

This paper estimates the impact of minimum wages on time use for people ages 16-19.
Using a framework developed by Holmes (1998) and Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010), the
eect is identied by comparing individuals within cross-state county pairs in cases where
there is a minimum wage dierence. This paper is an important addition to the literature for
multiple reasons. First, it is one of the only papers to consider the impact of the minimum
wage on school enrollment and labor force participation for teens. It is also one of the only
to do so while accounting for spatial heterogeneity, and the only to do so with a boundary
discontinuity design.
The results suggest there is a statistically signicant and positive impact on school en16 Allegretto, Dube, Reich, and Zipperer (2017) disagree, arguing that Neumark, Salas, and Wascher (2014)
use matching variables that are unlikely to be impacted by minimum wages.

Using a separate synthetic

control approach, Dube and Zipperer (2015) show clear evidence that donor weights vary substantially by
geographic distance. Regardless, the criticism is treated as valid for the sake of robustness.
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rollment, with the primary channel for this change coming through full-time enrollment.
There is some qualitative evidence that labor market participation rises for teens and rises,
but this evidence is uniformly not signicant. There is some statistically signicant evidence
that labor force participation for older adults rises, which could may displace teen workers.
If true, this would explain the increase in enrollment. There is no evidence that the results
are driven by spillover between county pairs, as results remain consistent when restricted to
individuals who never move. The main results are robust to alternative specications that
use more traditional estimation procedures.
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Appendix

Table A3.1: The Eect Of Minimum Wages With Linear Trends, Contiguous Sample
(1)

(2)

(3)

In school, all

In school, full-time

In school, part-time

165,187

160,190

48,250

In school, no labor

In school, no emp
0.0644
(0.0413)

Idle

0.00486
(0.0234)

127,109

133,765

165,187

In labor, 16-19

In labor, 20-24

In labor, 25-34

165,187

202,068

460,204

lnMW

0.0630
(0.0394)

N
lnMW

0.0593
(0.0395)

N
lnMW

N

-0.0045
(0.0412)

0.0729
(0.0430)

-0.0463
(0.0477)

0.0019
(0.0435)

0.00531
(0.0312)

Controls
Individual controls
Family controls
County controls
County FE
(Region)×(period)
State linear trends
State quadratic
trends
State cubic trends






















Notes: All specications include individual level controls, including age, gender, race, ethnicity, marital status, years of edu-

cation, and a dummy variable for completing high school; controls for family dynamics, including an individual's relation to
household head, the number of adults living in the household, and the number of children living in the household. They also all
include county xed eects, region-specic time eects, and linear state trends. All specications use data from the contiguous
county subset of CPS monthly sample.
*** Signicant at a 1 percent level.
** Signicant at a 5 percent level.
* Signicant at a 10 percent level.
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Table A3.2: The Eect Of Minimum Wages With Quadratic Trends, All Sample

lnMW

N
R

2

lnMW

N

R2

lnMW

N
R

2

(1)

(2)

(3)

In school, all

In school, full-time

In school, part-time

630,515
0.257

608,614
0.279

187,549
0.074

In school, no labor

In school, no emp
0.0760*
(0.0384)

Idle

-0.0259
(0.0178)

475,353
0.333

501,297
0.319

630,515
0.087

In labor, 16-19

In labor, 20-24

In labor, 25-34

630,515
0.166

746,576
0.079

1,622,541
0.098

0.0770**
(0.0347)

0.0824**
(0.0391)

0.0218
(0.0288)

0.0796**
(0.0328)

0.00294
(0.0242)

0.0093
(0.0343)

0.0281
(0.0175)

Controls
Individual controls
Family controls
County controls
County FE
(Region)×(period)
State linear trends
State quadratic
trends
State cubic trends

























Notes: All specications include individual level controls, including age, gender, race, ethnicity, marital status, years of edu-

cation, and a dummy variable for completing high school; controls for family dynamics, including an individual's relation to
household head, the number of adults living in the household, and the number of children living in the household. They also
all include county xed eects, region-specic time eects, and quadratic state trends. All specications use data from the full
CPS monthly sample.
*** Signicant at a 1 percent level.
** Signicant at a 5 percent level.
* Signicant at a 10 percent level
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Table A3.3: The Eect Of Minimum Wages With Local Time Eects, All Sample

lnMW

N
lnMW

N
lnMW

N

(1)

(2)

(3)

In school, all

In school, full-time

In school, part-time

630,515

608,614

187,549

In school, no labor

In school, no emp
0.293***
(0.0686)

-0.0315
(0.0388)

475,353

501,297

630,515

In labor, 16-19

In labor, 20-24

In labor, 25-34

630,515

746,576

1,622,541

0.269***
(0.0591)

0.302***
(0.0728)

-0.119***
(0.0438)

0.274***
(0.0587)

-0.0298
(0.0277)

0.0661
(0.0769)

Idle

0.0334*
(0.0194)

Controls
Individual controls
Family controls
County controls
County FE
(Region)×(period)
State linear trends
State quadratic
trends
State cubic trends
















Notes: All specications include individual level controls, including age, gender, race, ethnicity, marital status, years of edu-

cation, and a dummy variable for completing high school; controls for family dynamics, including an individual's relation to
household head, the number of adults living in the household, and the number of children living in the household. They also
all include state by urban by year xed eects. All specications use data from the full CPS monthly sample.
*** Signicant at a 1 percent level.
** Signicant at a 5 percent level.
* Signicant at a 10 percent level
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Table A3.4: The Eect Of Minimum Wages Without Spillover, Contiguous Sample

lnMW

N
lnMW

N
lnMW

N

(1)

(2)

(3)

In school, all

In school, full-time

In school, part-time

158,547

153,740

46,254

In school, no labor

In school, no emp
0.0894*
(0.0463)

0.0061
(0.0314)

122,115

128,539

158,547

In labor, 16-19

In labor, 20-24

In labor, 25-34

158,547

195,078

444,958

0.0927*
(0.0458)

0.0743
(0.0498)

0.0012
(0.0663)

0.1001**
(0.0464)

0.0608
(0.0801)

-0.0736
(0.0815)

Idle

0.0370
(0.0363)

Controls
Individual controls
Family controls
County controls
County FE
(County
pair)×(period)



















Notes: All specications include individual level controls, including age, gender, race, ethnicity, marital status, years of edu-

cation, and a dummy variable for completing high school; controls for family dynamics, including an individual's relation to
household head, the number of adults living in the household, and the number of children living in the household. They also
all include county xed eects, region-specic time eects, and quadratic state trends.
contiguous county sample, and is restricted to individuals who do not move locations.
*** Signicant at a 1 percent level.
** Signicant at a 5 percent level.
* Signicant at a 10 percent level

All specications use data from the
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Table A3.5: The Eect Of Placebo Minimum Wages, Contiguous Sample

lnPMW

N
lnPMW

N
lnPMW

N

(1)

(2)

(3)

In school, all

In school, full-time

In school, part-time

165,187

160,190

48,250

In school, no labor

In school, no emp
0.0282
(0.0270)

0.0219
(0.0187)

127,109

133,765

165,187

In labor, 16-19

In labor, 20-24

In labor, 25-34

165,187

202,068

460,209

0.0131
(0.0296)

0.0189
(0.0259)

-0.0215
(0.0310)

0.0148
(0.0271)

-0.0354
(0.0335)

0.0091
(0.0309)

Idle

-0.0034
(0.0186)

Controls
Individual controls
Family controls
County controls
County FE
(Region)×(period)
State linear trends
State quadratic
trends
State cubic trends

























Notes: All specications include individual level controls, including age, gender, race, ethnicity, marital status, years of edu-

cation, and a dummy variable for completing high school; controls for family dynamics, including an individual's relation to
household head, the number of adults living in the household, and the number of children living in the household. They also all
include county xed eects, region-specic time eects, and cubic state trends. All specications use data from the contiguous
CPS monthly sample.
*** Signicant at a 1 percent level.
** Signicant at a 5 percent level.
* Signicant at a 10 percent level.
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